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Defendant Class Actions Under Rule 23(b)(2):
Resolving the Language Dilemma
David H. Taylor*
I. INTRODUCTION
Class actions developed out of "the practical necessity of pro-
viding a procedural device so that mere numbers would not disable
large groups of individuals, united in interest, from enforcing their
... rights nor grant them immunity from their ... wrongs."'
Subsection (b)(2) of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, which provides for class certification in actions seeking
declaratory or injunctive relief,2 was primarily intended to provide
a procedural mechanism for public interest litigation.3 Most tra-
ditionally, the class seeking certification under subsection (b)(2) is
a class of plaintiffs who bring suit to establish, through declaration
and injunction, certain norms of conduct by a defendant. Certi-
fication of a plaintiff class ensures that the resulting decree will
have res judicata effect on the defendant with respect to all persons
who are adversely affected by the challenged behavior.
If provided for by subsection (b)(2), certification of a defendant
class in an action brought by an individual plaintiff or, in appro-
priate situations, by a plaintiff class, would be an extremely useful
device in public interest litigation to establish norms of conduct
applicable to a category of defendants, such as local governmental
officials, with regard to a plaintiff class of individuals, such as
* Visiting Assistant Professor, Northern Illinois University College of Law; B.A.,
1976, Duke University; J.D., 1980, Washington University (St. Louis). This Article is
dedicated to the memory of my father, Daniel H. Taylor.
1. CHsis A. WIGHT, LAW OF FEDERA CouRTs § 72, at 471 (4th ed. 1983) (quoting
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182, 187 (8th Cir. 1948)).
2. FED. R. Cwr. P. 23(b)(2).
3. Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102 (1966) (advisory committee's
note) [hereinafter Proposed Rules] ("Illustrative [of the type of actions contemplated by
subsection (b)(2)] are various actions in the civil-rights field where a party is charged with
discriminating unlawfully .... ") Although Rule 23(b)(2) was drafted with an eye to civil
rights litigation, the rule is not limited to civil rights cases. The Advisory Committee's note
also discusses the section's applicability to tying violations by patentees and unlawful pricing
differential practices of sellers. See also 1 HERBERT B. NEWBERo, NEWBERG ON ClAss
AcTioNs § 4.12, at 292-94 (2d ed. 1985).
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welfare recipients or pretrial detainees.4 Certification of a defen-
dant class would ensure that all those who engage in the challenged
behavior are bound by a decision that the practice is illegal.
Additionally, the defendant class mechanism is useful to resolve
the difficulty created by the recent decision in Martin v. Wilks in
which the Court held that persons who were affected by a decree
entered in a suit, but who neither had been named as parties nor
had sought timely leave to intervene, could later challenge the
decree.5 The defendant class action device would enable a court
to join as parties large numbers of individuals whose joinder
otherwise would be impracticable and who were not members of
an entity that could be sued. Without a mechanism by which such
persons could be brought into the litigation, a binding decree could
never be entered that would not be subject to later attack.6
4. Bilateral class litigation with certification of both a plaintiff and a defendant class
pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2), though a somewhat unique device, is not unheard
of. It has been utilized as an effective tool to obtain broad-based compliance with previously
established rights and obligations.
For example, in Callahan v. Wallace, 466 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1972), a bilateral class action
was brought on behalf of all persons tried before magistrates after a specified date for
traffic violations in Alabama against a class of all justices of the peace, sheriffs, and state
troopers in Alabama. The suit sought to end a practice in Alabama whereby a magistrate
would retain as compensation part of the fine leveled in a traffic case. The practice had
been previously declared unlawful in Bennet v. Cottingham, 290 F. Supp. 759, 763, aff'd,
393 U.S. 317 (1969). Although the United States Supreme Court had upheld the decision,
the Attorney General of Alabama considered it to be applicable only to the named
defendants, and the practice continued. Callahan, 466 F.2d at 61 n.2. Class certification
was upheld and an injunction was issued against the defendant class, thereby ending the
practice previously declared to be unlawful without the necessity of a multitude of identical
individual suits. Id. at 62.
See also Marcera v. Chinlund, 595 F.2d 1231 (2d Cir. 1979), vacated on other grounds
sub nom. Lombard v. Marcera, 442 U.S. 915 (1979) (state-wide plaintiff class of pretrial
detainees successfully brought suit against defendant class of county sheriffs who had
refused to allow plaintiffs to have contact visits with friends and family). For a detailed
discussion of Marcera, see infra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
5. 490 U.S. 755, 758, 761 (1989) (Court held that white firefighters who had not
been joined and had not sought timely intervention in an earlier employment discrimination
case could challenge the consent decree entered therein because they were affected by the
action).
6. For a discussion of the use of subsection (b)(2) defendant class actions as a possible
solution to the Martin v. Wilks problem, see George M. Strickler, Martin v. Wilks, 64
Ttn. L. RPv. 1557, 1596-99 (1990). Professor Strickler states that "courts have been far
from receptive to the concept" of subsection (b)(2) defendant class certification. Id. at
1596.
As discussed below, subsection (b)(2) is the only viable device for certification of a
defendant class. See infra note 17. Therefore, a resolution of the subsection (b)(2) dilemma
is necessary to resolve the situation created by Martin v. Wilks in which a binding resolution
in civil.rights litigation may be practically impossible because of the inability to bind to
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Yet, despite the efficacy of Rule 23(b)(2) as a means of con-
ducting litigation intended to establish broad-based norms of con-
duct, and the concomitant need in appropriate cases to have the
norms thus established bind all members of the class whose conduct
is sought to be influenced, courts have split on the issue of whether
Rule 23(b)(2) provides for defendant class certification. 7 The un-
certainty as to whether Rule 23(b)(2) provides for defendant class
certification arises from the specific language of the subsection.
While the general provisions of Rule 23(a) clearly contemplate
defendant class actions, the language of subsection (b)(2) is couched
in terms that make it unclear whether defendant class actions are
provided for by the subsection. The issue is presently pending on
appeal before the Supreme Court.8
the decree all those affected by the litigation.
As this Article was going to press, President Bush signed into law the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, which reversed the holding of Martin v. Wilks
in the area of employment discrimination. The Act prohibits the collateral challenge to a
consent decree entered in an action challenging discriminatory employment practices if the
person bringing the challenge, either, prior to the entry of the consent decree had actual
notice of the proposed consent decree and a reasonable opportunity to present objections
to the consent decree, or was someone whose interests had been adequately represented in
a previous challenge. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 108. Outside the area of employment
discrimination, defendant class certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) remains the only
viable mechanism to bind all persons to a decree who may be affected by that decree but
who are not members of a suable legal entity.
7. Decisions of the Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits are cited as holding that Rule
23(b)(2) does not provide for defendant class certification. Paxman v. Campbell, 612 F.2d
848, 854 (4th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1129 (1981); Thompson v.
Board of Educ., 709 F.2d 1200, 1204 (6th Cir. 1983); Henson v. East Lincoln Township,
814 F.2d 410, 416 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 484 U.S. 923, and deferral granted, 484 U.S.
1001 and 1057 (1987). As will be discussed later, neither Paxman nor Thompson actually
held Rule 23(b)(2) to be totally inapplicable to defendant class certification. Nevertheless,
in struggling with the dilemma of the language of Rule 23(b)(2) when applied to defendant
classes, both courts inserted into the subsection a requirement for certification that subsec-
tion (b)(2) does not provide and that is redundant of the general prerequisite requirements
of Rule 23(a)(2) and (3): "commonality" and "typicality." Though redundant, the newly
imposed requirement of Paxman and Thompson is more stringent and approaches "ident-
icality." See infra notes 57-65 and accompanying text. Citing Paxman and Thompson as
authority, Henson did hold subsection (b)(2) to be inapplicable to defendant class certifi-
cation. Henson, 814 F.2d at 413.
Most notably, the Second Circuit has found Rule 23(b)(2) to provide for defendant class
certification. Marcera v. Chinlund, 595 F.2d 1231, 1239 (2d Cir. 1979). For other cases
certifying defendant classes under Rule 23(b)(2), see infra notes 91-92, 96, 99, 108-10, 113,
120-22 and accompanying text.
8. Henson, 484 U.S. at 923. It appeared that the issue would be resolved when the
Supreme Court granted Mr. Henson's petition for writ of certiorari on November 2, 1987.
Subsequently, the parties involved have entered into settlement discussions deferring further
proceedings, and the question remains unresolved whether a defendant class may be certified
pursuant to FED. R. Cirv. P. 23(b)(2). Id. at 1001 and 1057.
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This Article explores the language dilemma created by the pro-
visions of subsection (b)(2). After setting out the precise nature of
the language dilemma, the Article discusses the arguments of those
courts that have denied subsection (b)(2) defendant class certifi-
cation based upon a literal reading of the subsection's language,
and the arguments of those courts that have used various devices,
some involving quite contorted reasoning, to overcome the lan-
guage dilemma based upon the functional need for defendant class
certification under subsection (b)(2). 9 The Article asserts that nei-
ther side has developed a persuasive argument for its position
because neither side has engaged in the thorough analysis grounded
in principles of statutory construction that is necessary to determine
the proper interpretation of Rule 23(b)(2). The Article then offers
such an analysis, in which it demonstrates that defendant class
certification is provided for under Rule 23(b)(2).
II. THE RULE 23(b)(2) DEFENDANT CLASS ACTION LANGUAGE
DmEmMA
A. A Brief Background of Rule 23
A determination as to whether a suit may be maintained as a
class action pursuant to Rule 23 involves a two-step, conjunctive
process. 10 First, the proposed class must satisfy each of the four
prerequisites of paragraph (a):" 1) "numerosity" of class
9. As will be discussed herein, two schools of thought have emerged on (b)(2) class
certification and have received much discussion by commentators. On the side of certifi-
cation, see Scott D. Miller, Note, Certification of Defendant Classes Under Rule 23(b)(2),
84 CoLuM. L. Ray. 1371 (1984). For the arguments opposing certification, see Angelo N.
Ancheta, Comment, Defendant Class Actions and Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 33 UCLA
L. REv. 283 (1985); and Note, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23: A Defendant Class
Action with a Public Official as the Named Representative, 9 VAL. U. L. Rnv. 357 (1975).
10. Class certification of either a plaintiff or a defendant class involves the same
general application of the two step requirement of Rule 23. See Proposed Rules, supra
note 3, at 100, "Subdivision (a) states the prerequisites for maintaining any class action
..... " (emphasis added).
11. See FED. R. CIrv. P. 23(b) ("An action may be maintained as a class action if the
prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied . . .
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) provides:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or
be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions
of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
[Vol. 40
1991] DEFENDANT CLASS ACTIONS
members; 2 2) "commonality" among the members of the proposed
class members of factual or legal questions;' 3 3) "typicality" of
the claims or defenses of the representative with regard to those
of unnamed class members; 4 and, 4) "adequacy of representation"
by the representative party of the interests of the class.' 5 The
language of Rule 23(a), "a class may sue or be sued," clearly
states that a defendant class action may be maintained under Rule
23.16
Second, after meeting the four prerequisites of Rule 23(a), the
proposed action must fit within at least one of the three categories
of actions described in paragraph (b).' 7 Although none of the three
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1); see 3B JAmES W. MOORE & Jom E. KENNEDY, MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.05[1], at 23-137 (2d ed. 1991) ("The raison d'etre of the class suit
is necessity, which in turn depends upon the question of when is a class so numerous as
to make ... [joinder] impracticable to bring all its members individually before the
court."); see also 7A CHARLEs A. WRaoH ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
1762, at 150-95 (2d ed. 1986); 1 NEWBERO, supra note 3, §§ 3.03-3.09, at 134-52.
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2); see 3B MooRE & KENNEDY, supra note 12, 23.0611],
at 23-159 to 23-160 (courts generally do "not require that all questions of fact and law be
common, but only [demand] that a question of law or fact be presented which is shared
in the grievances of the prospective class as defined"); see also 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 12, § 1763, at 196-228; 1 NEWBERG, supra note 3, §§ 3.10-3.12, at 153-63.
14. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(a)(3); see 3B MOORE & KENNEDY, supra note 12, 23.06[2],
at 23-175 to -176 ("It has been consistently held that typicality of claims does not require
that the claims of the individual class members to be identical."); 1 NEWBERO, supra note
12, § 4.57, at 396 ("Rule 23(a)(3) typicality of claims or defenses focuses on the presence
of a common issue from the perspective of the proposed class representative."); see also
7A WRIHT r AL., supra note 12, § 1764, at 228-62; 1 NEWBERG, supra note 3, §§ 3.13-
3.20, at 163-97.
15. FED. R. Cirv. P. 23(a)(4); see 3B MOORE & KENNEDY, supra note 12, 23.0711],
at 23-188 (generally, courts "consider (1) whether the interest of the named party is
coextensive with the interests of the other members of the class; (2) whether his interests
are antagonistic in any way to the interests of those whom he represents; (3) the proportion
of those made parties as compared with the total membership of the class; and (4) any
other facts bearing on the ability of the named party to speak for the rest of the class");
see also 7A WIGHT ET AL., supra note 12, § 1765, at 262-94; 1 NEWBERG, supra note 3,
§§ 3.21-3.27, at 197-212.
16. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) ("One or more members of a class may sue or be sued
.... ") (emphasis added).
17. See Proposed Rules, supra note 3, at 100 ("Subdivision (b) describes the additional
elements which in varying situations justify the use of a class action.").
FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b) provides:
(b) Class Action Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if
the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the
class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members
of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the
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categories explicitly address whether a defendant class may be
party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would
as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not
parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to
protect their interest; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or
corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of
the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and
that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include:
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution
or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation
concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the
class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the
claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in
the management of a class action.
Subsection (b)(1), which is divided into two clauses, (b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B), provides a
mechanism to bring a unitary action to resolve multiple claims in situations in which there
would be a risk of inconsistent adjudications if multiple individual actions were pursued.
Proposed Rules, supra note 3, at 100-02. Subsection (A) seeks to avoid the creation of
such inconsistencies for the party opposing the class in respect to individual members of
the class. Subsection (B) is designed to prevent what would amount to the practical
disposition of the interests, or prejudice to the interests of persons not parties to the
adjudication. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(1).
To date, defendant class certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(1), particularly in the area
of civil rights enforcement, has not often been sought, and the area remains largely
unexplored. See 7 WRIGHT E AL., supra note 12, § 1772, at 421, 423; 1 NEWBERO, supra
note 3, § 4.04, at 275. This is most likely due to the fact that Rule 23(b)(2) is the category
that was designed to provide injunctive and declaratory relief to an aggrieved plaintiff
class, particularly in the area of civil rights litigation, and it is that which has most often
been invoked for that purpose. In light of the defendant class action device pursuant to
Rule 23(b)(2) no longer being viable in the Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, perhaps
Rule 23(b)(1)(A) will be explored as a mechanism for civil rights defendant class action
litigation.
Defendant class certification under subsection (b)(l)(A) has been limited to a few areas
such as trademark and patent infringement. See, e.g., 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 12,
§ 1773, at 435-36; 1 NEwBERo, supra note 3, § 4.63, at 407-08. Defendant class certification
pursuant to Rule 23(b)(1)(B) has been largely limited to situations where plaintiffs seek to
obtain relief from a common limited fund which does not contain sufficient resources to
satisfy all claims. 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 12, § 1774, at 441-43. This is due to the
requirement of Rule 23(b)(l)(B)-that as a "practical matter" the adjudication would be
"dispositive of the interests of other members not parties to the adjudication"-having
been interpreted to necessitate the showing of something more than the decision being given
stare decisis effect in subsequent litigation brought by the "other members" who are not
"parties." For cases holding that something more than stare decisis effect is needed to
meet the requirements of Rule 23(b)(l)(B), see 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 12, § 1774,
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maintained under its provisions, categorical subsections (b)(1) and
(b)(3) each contain language that indicates the subsection is appli-
cable to defendant class certification. 8 The language of subsection
(b)(2) does not contain a comparable expression of applicability
to defendant class certification, nor does it state any exclusion
from applicability to defendant classes. It is at best awkward in
its application to defendant classes and can be read to be inappli-
cable to defendant class certification.' 9 It is that reading that led
to the prohibition of (b)(2) defendant classes in Henson v. East
Lincoln Township and the imposition of a new requirement for
(b)(2) defendant classes in Paxman v. Campbell and Thompson v.
Board of Education.20
at 439 n.4.
As previously noted, subsection (b)(2) was intended by its drafters to provide a mechanism
for class action civil rights litigation. See Proposed Rules, supra note 3, at 102 ("[I]llustrative
[of the type of actions contemplated by subsection (b)(2)] are various actions in the civil-
rights field where a party is charged with discriminating unlawfully .... "). For examples
of cases where defendant classes have been certified in suits seeking injunctive relief against
government agencies, see 1 NEWBERO, supra note 3, § 4.08, at 287 n.88. Nevertheless, it
is not limited to such actions and has been utilized in many other contexts. See id. § 4.12,
at 292-94.
Numerous defendant classes have been certified under subsection (b)(2), which has been
the most commonly used device for defendant classes. The Henson court states that there
have been 45 cases in which defendant classes have been certified as subsection (b)(2)
classes. Henson v. East Lincoln Township, 814 F.2d 410, 413 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 484
U.S. 923, and deferral granted, 484 U.S. 1001 and 1057 (1987). The actual number exceeds
45, but it is not necessary to burden this Article with a list of every instance of (b)(2)
defendant class certification. The Article categorizes the body of cases by the manner with
which the cases have dealt with the language dilemma as "by hook," "by crook," and
"by no look" and provides examples of each. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
Class certification pursuant to subsection (b)(3) is by far the most encompassing for it
provides for class certification where common questions of law or fact predominate over
individual questions, and the class action device is "superior" to other methods of
adjudication. The type of civil rights litigation in Henson, Paxman, and Thompson could
certainly qualify for defendant class certification under subsection (b)(3), but because of
its breadth of scope, subsection (b)(3) is subject to a requirement unique to the three
categories of class actions. Rule 23(c)(2) requires that members of a (b)(3) class be given
notice of the pending action that allows a specific time period within which the notified
member may exclude itself from the class. If unruly potential defendants are refusing to
comply with established legal obligations, it is highly unlikely that they would not exercise
their right to "opt out" of the litigation upon receiving notification and further escape
being subjected to enforcement.
18. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b)(1) ("the prosecution of separate actions by or against
individual members"); FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A) ("the prosecution or defense"); FED.
R. Crv. P. 23(b)(3)(B) ("commenced by or against members of the class").
19. This Article argues that a fair reading of Rule 23(b)(2) is ambiguous as to defendant
class certification. Therefore, an analysis of statutory interpretation is necessary to derive
the subsection's applicability to defendant class certification. See infra notes 128-44 and
accompanying text.
20. Henson, 814 F.2d at 414-15; Thompson v. Board of Educ., 709 F.2d 1200, 1203-
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B. The Language Dilemma of Subsection (b)(2)
Subsection (b)(2), the only one of the three categorical subsec-
tions which is relief oriented, provides for injunctive relief or
declaratory relief when "the party opposing the class has acted or
refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby
making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declar-
atory relief with respect to the class as a whole. ' 21 Because it is
the action or inaction of the party who is in opposition to the
class that is the object of the injunctive relief, the subsection may
be read as if it is only the plaintiff who may be a class and obtain
the benefit of injunctive relief against the party, the defendant. 22
Otherwise, one would face the anomaly that the plaintiff's actions
or refusals to act in regard to a defendant class provide the basis
for class certification in a suit filed for the purpose of obtaining
injunctive relief against the defendant class. 2 Therefore, the iron-
ical situation exists that the device designed by the Advisory
Committee for class certification in the area of civil rights enforce-
ment,2 and best suited for defendant class certification, 2 does not
expressly provide so on its face. As is often quoted by those
opposed to (b)(2) defendant class certification, the language of the
subsection must be "stretched ... to allow" defendant classes.
26
04 (6th Cir. 1983); Paxman v. Campbell, 612 F.2d 848, 854 (4th Cir. 1980) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1129 (1981).
21. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) (emphasis added).
22. The language dilemma often has been discussed by the commentators. See, e.g.,
Ancheta, supra note 9, at 311-12, 323 (most often cited as the leading writing in opposition
to (b)(2) defendant class certification); Note, supra note 9, at 390-96 (also concluding that
the rule does not provide for defendant class certification); Diane Terrell, Comment,
Defendant Class Certification: The Difficulties Under Rule 23(b)(2) and the Rule 65(d)
Solution, 8 N. Iui. U. L. Ra,. 143, 155-56 (1987); Note, Defendant Class Actions, 91
HARv. L. Rnv. 630, 634 n.23 (1978). But see Miller, supra note 9, at 1376-78 (most often
cited as the leading writing in favor of (b)(2) defendant class certification; though, as will
be discussed at infra notes 64-65, 116-19 and accompanying text, this work argues for
limiting defendant certification to situations in which the members of the class are
"juridically linked.") This Article will argue that such requirement is unnecessary because
it is redundant of the provisions of Rule 23(a)(2) and (3).
23. Courts struggling with the dilemma of the subsection's applicability to defendant
classes have invented creative contortions to find action or inaction warranting injunctive
or declaratory relief on the part of the plaintiff opposing the defendant class. See infra
notes 89-100 and accompanying text for discussion of certification "by hook" of a
subsection (b)(2) defendant class.
24. Proposed Rules, supra note 3 at 95, 102.
25. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
26. 3B MooRE & KENNEDY, supra note 12, 23.40[6] at 23-285. Many cases discussing
the applicability of subsection (b)(2) to defendant class certification have cited a previous
edition of Moore's for the proposition that the language of subsection (b)(2) must be
"wrenched to fit" defendant classes. 3B JAmas W. MooRE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRA TIcE,
23.4016], at 23-310 (1985).
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At the same time, however, in light of the general provision for
defendant classes in subsection (a),27 it is puzzling that the subsec-
tion does not expressly provide for the exclusion of defendant
class certification if that was intended.
III. Two ScHooLs OF THouGHT
Two schools of thought have developed on the applicability of
subsection (b)(2) to defendant class certification. These can be
viewed as the literalists and the functionalists;2 the former viewing
the language of Rule 23(b)(2) as not providing for defendant class
certification, and the latter ignoring the difficulty with the language
27. See FEa. R. Cirv. P. 23(a) ("One or more members of a class may sue or be sued
as representative parties .... ").
28. The term "literalist" has been used by various commentators to refer to the school
of thought that finds that Rule 23(b)(2) does not support the certification of defendant
classes. See, e.g., Ancheta, supra note 9, at 315-17 (referring to "literal interpretations");
Terrell, supra note 22, at 156-57 (referring to the "literal approach").
The school referred to in this Article as the functionalists has been most often divided
into two approaches called instrumental and plaintiff-based. See Ancheta, supra note 9, at
312-15 (referring to "instrumental certification" and "plaintiff-based certification"); Terrell,
supra note 22, at 157-60 (referring to the "instrumental approach" and the "plaintiff-
based approach"); Miller, supra note 9, at 1392-94 (referring to "plaintiff-based certifica-
tion").
The author disagrees with the division of approaches, both for and against certification,
into the three approaches utilized above. The issue is viewed more clearly by first dividing
the issue into the camp in favor of certification and the camp opposed. The distinction
between the two camps is that the "instrumentalists" advocate defendant class certification
under subsection (b)(2) largely because of the usefulness of the tool and the necessity for
widespread injunctive relief. The instrumentalists have not sought to resolve the difficulty
with the language of the Rule. See infra notes 101-18 and accompanying text for a
discussion of subsection (b)(2) defendant class certification "by crook."
As discussed at infra notes 89-95 and accompanying text, the plaintiff-based camp
advocates defendant class certification stating that the language of subsection (b)(2) does
not pose a difficulty to certification because the plaintiff class has acted on "grounds
generally applicable to the [proposed defendant] class," thereby removing the difficulty
with the language. This argument is but one of several methods employed by the function-
alists to rationalize (b)(2) defendant class certification.
As will be discussed later, the functionalists have actually taken more than these two
lines of reasoning, but the overriding concern of this school of thought is to perpetuate
the function of (b)(2) defendant class certification. Additionally, though the commentators
refer to two methods used to support certification, they are not in agreement as to the
rationale used by the two. For example, one commentator refers to "certification by
analogy," Miller, supra note 9, at 1394, which the other commentators have not discussed.
The disagreement is caused because there actually have been more than two methods
employed. Hence, those who have advocated that subsection (b)(2) supports certification
of defendant classes will be referred to as the functionalists, and the several approaches
they have used will be discussed individually as approaches of "by hook," "by crook,"
and "by no look."
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in order to retain the device as a matter of judicial economy and
social utility. The analysis of each side has been incomplete. The
literalists have done little more than read Rule 23(b)(2) in isolation
from the rest of Rule 23. The functionalists have failed to provide
a valid explanation for overcoming the difficulty with the language.
Therefore, the dilemma has been little more than acknowledged
by both sides, and neither has offered a defensible resolution.29
A. The Literalists
The literalist approach appears to have originated with Wright
& Miller3" and has been furthered by several other commentators. 31
It formed the basis for several lower court decisions which denied
defendant class certification under subsection (b)(2),32 and reached
29. The resolution is not complex. It simply involves the application of accepted
principles of statutory interpretation in order to discern the applicability of subsection (b)(2)
to defendant class certification. See infra notes 125-65 and accompanying text. Though
courts faced with the issue have applied principles of statutory interpretation, they have
done so in a piecemeal fashion. Resolution requires a comprehensive analysis.
30. See 7A CHARLas A. W oasr & ARTrm~R R. MiaLt, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PRO-
CEDURE, Crvn § 1775, at 21-22 (1972), which mentions the difficulty with the applicability
of the language to defendant class actions. Prior to that work, the decision in Technograph
Printed Circuits Ltd. v. Methode Blecs., 285 F. Supp. 714, 723 (N.D. Ill. 1968), noted
that subsection (b)(2) required that the plaintiff have acted on grounds generally applicable
to the class in a defendant class situation. Nevertheless, the court did not find this to be
any impediment to defendant class certification and used creative ways to find the required
actions by the plaintiffs, thereby choosing to ignore the anomaly of basing certification of
a defendant class in order to provide injunctive relief against that class upon the acts of
the plaintiffs. See infra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
31. See 3B Moore & KENNEDY, supra note 12, 23.4016], at 23-284 to -288, and
23.40 n.17 (Supp. 1973); Note, supra note 9, at 391-96; Ancheta, supra note 9, at 315-17.
32. See, e.g., Coleman v. McLaren, 98 F.R.D. 638, 651-52 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Mudd v.
Busse, 68 F.R.D. 522, 530 (N.D. Ind. 1975); Stewart v. Winter, 87 F.R.D. 760, 770 (N.D.
Miss. 1980), aff'd on other grounds, 669 F.2d 328 (5th Cir. 1982).
In Coleman, the court apparently held that a defendant class never may be certified
under subsection (b)(2).
In Mudd, bilateral class action was brought by pre-trial detainees against Indiana judicial
officers challenging certain bond procedures. It is unclear whether the court denied certi-
fication solely because it viewed (b)(2) to be inapplicable to defendant class certification.
The court discussed the problem with the language but said that the Wright & Miller
argument (see supra note 30) was considered and rejected in Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F.
Supp. 38, 53 (E.D. Pa. 1973), order rev'd with directions, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1039 (1974). The court then distinguished Gibbs, stating that it was a suit
challenging the constitutional validity of a statute. Perhaps the court would have maintained
(b)(2) defendant class certification if Mudd had been such a suit. As discussed infra notes
47-51, 57-60, 83 and accompanying text, the court is reading into subsection (b)(2) a
requirement that is redundant of Rule 23(a)(2) and (3), yet more restrictive.
In Stewart, the court engaged in an analysis very similar to that of Mudd when
distinguishing the authority cited by plaintiff for defendant class certification as involving
more typical claims.
1991] DEFENDANT CLASS ACTIONS 87
its greatest notoriety with decisions of the Fourth, 33 Sixth, 34 and
Seventh35 Circuits. 36 With Paxman v. Campbell, the Fourth Circuit
became the first appellate court to endorse the literalist approach.
In Paxman, two public school teachers brought suit on behalf
of themselves and all pregnant public school teachers in the State
of Virginia against a class of defendants, comprised of all city or
county school boards in the State of Virginia, which numbered
more than 130. 37 The suit alleged that maternity leave policies of
the defendant class violated the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The validity of the claims
of plaintiffs was not subject to dispute, for the Supreme Court
previously had held that policies similar to those being challenged
by the plaintiffs were violative of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 38 The law having been declared in the
area, the plaintiffs were attempting to obtain the compliance of
recalcitrant school districts that chose not to stop doing what the
Supreme Court had ruled unconstitutional for school districts to
33. Paxman v. Campbell, 612 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1129 (1981).
34. Thompson v. Board of Educ., 709 F.2d 1200 (6th Cir. 1983).
35. Henson v. East Lincoln Township, 814 F.2d 410 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 484
U.S. 923, and deferral granted, 484 U.S. 1001 and 1057 (1987). Prior to Henson, the
Seventh Circuit had expressed doubt about the applicability of the language of subsection
(b)(2) to defendant class certification but did not need to reach a decision on the issue
because the court denied certification of the proposed bilateral plaintiff class, thereby
obviating the need for a defendant class. Adashunas v. Negley, 626 F.2d 600, 604-05 (7th
Cir. 1980).
36. The Fifth Circuit has also expressed its concern with the "troublesome issue" of
whether subsection (b)(2) provides for defendant class actions because of the literal language
of the rule. See Greenhouse v. Greco, 617 F.2d 408, 413 n.6 (5th Cir. 1980). Greco was a
bilateral class action challenging alleged discriminatory practices of certain parochial schools
within a diocese. The court did not have to reach the issue because it found that the
requirements of Rule 23(a) were not met in the case. As will be argued at infra notes 47-
51, 57-60, 83 and accompanying text, Rule 23(a) is the proper area of inquiry for the
concerns of those courts which have denied (b)(2) defendant class certification on the basis
of the language dilemma. Greco found that the proposed defendant class did not have an
adequate class representative as required by Rule 23(a)(4) because the named representative
"ha[d] no intention of defending the policies and interests of [other members of the
defendant class]." Id. at 412.
37. The defendant class was certified as, "all persons who were or are, during the
period December 6, 1969 to June 25, 1975, members of a public county or city school
board of the Commonwealth of Virginia which required that a pregnant school teacher
cease her teaching at some time during the period of preguancy other than a time of her
own choosing." Paxman v. Campbell, 612 F.2d 848, 852 (4th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1129 (1981).
38. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 650 (1974).
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do. 39 Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief and back
pay they allegedly had lost as a result of the unlawful policies of
the defendant class.4°
The Fourth Circuit determined, in less than one page of text
encompassing two paragraphs, that subsection (b)(2) did not pro-
vide for the certification of a defendant class. 41 The decision made
no mention of the numerous prior cases that had certified defen-
dant classes and made no acknowledgment of the arguments in
favor of defendant class certification. The decision is based on
nothing more than a literal reading of subsection (b)(2), separate
and apart from the rest of the rule, and the dilemma caused by
the subsection's language, which reads as if it provides only for
injunctive relief on behalf of a class of plaintiffs against a single
defendant. As authority, the opinion cites Wright & Miller, whose
analysis goes no deeper than that of the opinion. 42
39. Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr. told the following story applicable to the situation
in which a defendant class action is brought for the purpose of obtaining compliance with
an established legal obligation:
This fellow had a mule he couldn't train. When he told it to giddy-up, why the
mule would stop. But when he'd tell it to whoa, the mule would get up. You'd
tell it to gee, it would haw. You'd tell it to haw, it would gee. He finally decided
he had to take it to a mule trainer, and he did. He took it across the county,
left it, and told the man what he wanted. The man said, "Sure, I think I can
train your mule," he says, "leave your mule here, and come back in 30 days."
The man started to walk off that owned the mule, and the mule trainer picked
up a singletree, a piece of wood about three feet long, you know what a singletree
is. So he knocked the mule in the head with it. The mule fell to his feet, and
the owner of the mule says, the man says, "I wanted you to train my mule. I
didn't want you to beat him to death." And the man says, "Well, I haven't
started training your mule." He says, "I'm just trying to get his attention."
-Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr., Interview with Bill Moyers, July 24, 1980, on getting the
attention of Alabama local school boards in desegregation cases as retold in JUDGE FRANK
JOHNSON: ANTics AND ANCDOESS 14 (anonymous editors, 1985).
As United States District Court Judge for the Middle District of Alabama, Judge Johnson
had occasion to certify defendant classes in several actions brought by plaintiffs to obtain
the compliance of recalcitrant officials of the State of Alabama with established legal
obligations. Two of those cases figure significantly in the resolution proposed by this
Article to the dilemma of whether Rule 23(b)(2) provides for the certification of defendant
classes. See infra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
40. It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court's decision in Cleveland Bd. of
Educ., 414 U.S. at 636-38, 648, 650-51, reversed the decision of the Fourth Circuit in
Cohen v. Chesterfield County Sch. Bd., 474 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 414 U.S. 632
(1974). Having been reversed on the substantive issue, perhaps the Fourth Circuit was
looking for a procedural method to bar the relief sought by plaintiffs.
41. Paxman, 612 F.2d at 854. At the time that Paxman was decided, subsection (b)(2)
defendant classes had been certified on many occasions. See infra notes 90, 92, 96, 99,
102, 104-05, 108-10, 113, 115, 120-22 and accompanying text.
42. Paxman, 612 F.2d at 854 (quoting 7A WRIoHT & MMIna, supra note 30, § 1775,
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Also cited as authority by the Fourth Circuit, are the Notes of
the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee.43 The Notes do little
to resolve the dilemma created by the language of subsection
(b)(2), because they employ the precise language of the rule. They
are not conclusive as to whether the use of the phrase, "party has
taken action or refused to take action with respect to the class,"
was intended to exclude the defendant class action device from
subsection (b)(2) and make the subsection applicable only to si-
tuations in which a class of plaintiffs seeks relief against a single
defendant. Unfortunately, the Notes are completely silent as to
defendant class actions under subsection (b)(2), as well as under
the entire Rule 23.
Paxman typifies the literalist approach. Its lack of analysis makes
it less than persuasive authority, and it leaves two basic questions
unanswered. First, although subsection (b)(2), when read in iso-
lation from the language of subsection (a), does not literally
provide for certification of a defendant class, how does the literalist
approach reconcile Rule 23 when read as a whole? The prerequisite
provisions of subsection (a) clearly provide for the certification of
a defendant class.44 Second, were so many courts so wrong when
they certified defendant classes? 45 At least some mention of the
adverse authority is warranted.46
at 21-22 ("It should be noted that the injunctive relief must be sought in favor of the
class. As a result, an action to enjoin a class from pursuing or failing to pursue some
course of conduct would not fall under Rule 23(b)(2) .... "). Unfortunately, the authority
cited contains no deeper analysis than that engaged in by the Fourth Circuit. Wright and
Miller merely recite the language dilemma and conclude that subsection (b)(2) does not
provide for the certification of a defendant class.
43. Id. at 854 (quoting Proposed Rules, supra note 3, at 102: "This subdivision [(b)(2)]
is intended to reach situations where a party has taken action or refused to take action
with respect to a class, and final relief of an injunctive nature or of a corresponding
declaratory nature, settling the legality of the behavior with respect to the class as a whole,
is appropriate."). This quotation is from the two paragraphs of the Advisory Committee's
notes that address subsection (b)(2).
44. Recently, an author argued that, in light of the "sue or be sued language" of
Rule 23(a), one would have to first determine "that the drafters could not have meant
what they said" to conclude that subsection (b)(2) is inapplicable to defendant classes.
Stephen C. Yeazell, Collective Litigation as Collective Action, 1 U. ILL. L. REy. 43, 46
(1989). As discussed herein, this argument is not without difficulty and does not in and of
itself conclusively resolve the issue. See infra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
45. Numerous cases have certified defendant classes under subsection (b)(2). See infra
notes 90, 92, 96, 99, 102, 104-05, 108, 109-10, 113, 115, 120-22.
46. This seems particularly appropriate in light of the Supreme Court's decision in
Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968) (per curiam) (affirming a lower court decision
which had granted injunctive and declaratory relief against a defendant class of correction
officials). See infra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
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More importantly, the Fourth Circuit's expressed concerns with
defendant class certification have little to do substantively with the
language dilemma of Rule 23(b)(2). They are more properly rooted
in Rule 23(a)(2) and (3), the commonality and typicality prere-
quisites.47 The court expressed concern that each school board,
whose members comprised the defendant class, may have had
widely varying policies on maternity leave, and that the similarities
among those policies were unknown. 48 If the substance of the
challenged policies was in fact unknown, making it impossible for
the court to determine whether similarities existed, it can only
follow that the plaintiffs did not sustain their burden of establishing
that the proposed defendant class met the prerequisites of section
(a), and defendant class certification should have been denied on
that basis.49 If the prerequisites of section (a) were not met, there
47. See FED. R. Cirv. P. 23(a)(2) ("questions of law or fact common to the class");
FED. R. Crv. P. 23(a)(3) ("claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of
the claims and defenses of the class").
48. See Paxinan v. Campbell, 612 F.2d 848, 854 n.9 (4th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1129 (1981) ("In this case, in contrast, more than 130 different school
boards were free to adopt maternity leave policies of entirely unknown differences or
similarities. It is uncontradicted that there was no state-wide policy in force, centrally
directed or otherwise.").
49. The Paxman court, itself, had recognized that the burden of establishing the
prerequisites is on the plaintiffs (citing Carracters v. Morgan, 491 F.2d 458, 459 (4th Cir.
1973); Poindexter v. Teubert, 462 F.2d 1096, 1097 (4th Cir. 1972)). Id. at 855.
Courts have refused to certify defendant classes because of a lack of commonality or
typicality of the defenses of the class members or the class representative. See, e.g., Ellis
v. O'Hara, 105 F.R.D. 556, 563-64 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (denied certification of a (b)(2)
defendant class comprised of "[a]ll juvenile officers, guardians ad litem appointed by
juvenile courts, school officials, Division of Family Service employees, and local law
enforcement officers who are delegated power under the challenged state statutes to utilize
state courts to investigate parents who choose to offer their children at home an education
that is Christ-centered and based on the Holy Bible," because of lack of typicality among
defenses in a suit brought to challenge a Missouri compulsory education statute as well as
statutes that provide for investigation of parents in homes of children suspected to be
victims of educational neglect); Rios v. Marshall, 100 F.R.D. 395, 412-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(denied certification of defendant class comprised of "all New York apple growers who
have applied for the use of temporary foreign workers from 1975 to the present," because
of lack of typicality of defenses in a suit brought by 38 U.S. citizen migrant farm workers
alleging a conspiracy among defendants to replace them with foreign workers); Manning
v. Princeton Consumer Discount Co., 390 F. Supp. 320, 324 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (denied
certification of defendant class of automobile dealers and consumer loan companies in a
challenge to alleged industry practice of treating credit sales as loan transactions in violation
of Truth in Lending Act, in part, because the plaintiffs' allegation-that the legality of the
proposed class members' conduct made the claims against the class typical-was meaning-
less), aff'd, 533 F.2d 102 (1977); Conigio v. Highwood Serv., Inc., 60 F.R.D. 359, 363,
364 (W.D.N.Y. 1972) (denied certification of a defendant class of all National Football
League teams in a challenge to an alleged practice of requiring season ticket holders to
19911 DEFENDANT CLASS ACTIONS
was no reason for the court to address the subsection (b)(2)
dilemma.5 0 Nevertheless, the concerns of the court that there was
no "statewide policy" 5' in question indicate that the court was
looking for something beyond commonality or typicality-perhaps
"identicality."
The second literalist case, Thompson v. Board of Education,2
involved the same claims as Paxman and sought certification of
an almost identical defendant class.5 3 The opinion quotes Paxman
extensively, stating that the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit is
"sound" and should be "followed" and recites the language
dilemma of the subsection.5 4 Thus, the Thompson opinion appears
to be strictly following the literalist approach but then becomes
unclear as to whether it is actually holding that subsection (b)(2)
is not applicable to defendant class actions.
purchase tickets to exhibition games, because the commonality requirement was not met in
that the practices in question were found to vary greatly within each locality and "share
little if anything in common").
50. The Paxman court also overstated the problem caused by the differences, or lack
of commonality or typicality, among the defenses of the defendant class. Plaintiffs simply
sought an injunction against policies which treated pregnancy differently than other tem-
porary disabilities. 612 F.2d at 852. The constitutionality of individual policies was not at
issue. The suit was brought in order to obtain broad-based compliance with the decision
of the Supreme Court which declared such disparity in the treatment of pregnancy as
unconstitutional. Id. at 853.
The problem was rooted in the proposed definition of the defendant class. See supra
note 37. If the definition had included the phrase "because of a policy which treats
pregnancy differently than other disabilities," school boards which did not have offending
policies would not be members of the defendant class. See id. at 854 n.9. Compare with
Paxman the definition of the proposed defendant class in Thompson v. Board of Educ.,
709 F.2d 1200, 1202 (6th Cir. 1983):
All school boards in the State of Michigan which, since March 24, 1972, have
treated or now treat pregnancy related disabilities differently than other temporary
disabilities, limited to the school boards in districts wherein the MEA [Michigan
Education Association] has female members who have been or will be subject to
such policies or practices.
Though more than 130 possibly different policies were being challenged in Paxman, such
a definition would obviate the need for the court to inquire into the specifics of each
policy. Paxman, 612 F.2d at 854 n.9. By means of the class definition, only those parties
who would have no defense, because of the issue having been previously decided by a
higher court, would be defendants.
51. Paxman, 612 F.2d. at 854 n.9.
52. Thompson, 709 F.2d at 1200.
53. See supra note 50. Defendants alleged that the defendant class included approxi-
mately 500 school districts, each of which may have had different maternity leave policies.
Thompson, 709 F.2d at 1202. As with Paxman, the court's concerns may have been more
properly addressed as a commonality or typicality problem, but the class definition largely
removes that problem.
54. Id. at 1204.
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In equivocating language, the opinion indicates that the court
would certify a (b)(2) defendant class if the defendant class had
some "binding link" or were operating under a common directive. 55
As with Paxman, this discussion indicates that the court's concerns
more properly would have been addressed as a commonality or
typicality problem, and that if certification of a defendant class
was not proper, it was not proper due to a failure to meet the
requirements of Rule 23(a)(2) or (3). Therefore, it is unclear
whether the court is holding that a defendant class may not be
certified under subsection (b)(2), or whether it is holding that a
defendant class may only be certified under subsection (b)(2) if
there is a common directive or binding link, ensuring that com-
monality and typicality are present. The language most strongly
suggests the latter, yet Thompson, together with Paxman, is cited
by courts and commentators as holding the former.s
This latter interpretation of the holdings of Paxman and Thomp-
son, that a subsection (b)(2) defendant class is appropriate if there
is a common directive or binding link among the members of the
defendant class, though more properly rooted in the commonality
and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a)(2) and (3), speaks to
typicality and commonality in a heightened sense. Neither require-
ment has been held to require that the issues presented by the
55.
It is true, as the district court indicated, that in very limited circumstances some
courts have been willing to recognize a defendant class under Rule 23(b)(2). These
circumstances, however, generally have been restricted to situations where the
individual defendants are all acting to enforce "a locally administered state statute
or similar administrative policies." Greenhouse v. Greco, 617 F.2d 408, 413, n.6
(5th Cir. 1980). The present case involves approximately 500 separate school
districts, each of which was free to adopt its own maternity leave policies. No
state statute or uniform administrative policies are involved in the case. The
district court acknowledged that "[t]his is not a case where all defendants are
acting under one directive from some superior authority or where there is an
obvious binding link among all defendants on this particular policy issue." 519
F. Supp. at 1377 [Thompson district court case]. In light of the above, we see
no reason to depart from the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit in Paxman.
Thompson, 709 F.2d at 1204.
56. See, e.g., Henson v. East Lincoln Township, 814 F.2d 410, 413 (7th Cir.), cert.
granted, 484 U.S. 923, and deferral granted, 484 U.S. 1001 and 1057 (1987); 1 NEWBERG,
supra note 3, § 4.64, at 409 n.674; Strickler, supra note 6, at 1596 n.166; Mark C. Weber,
Preclusion and Procedural Due Process in Rule 23(b)(2) Class Actions, 21 U. MicH. J.L.
REF. 347, 402 n.220 (1988); Ancheta, supra note 9, at 316; Robert E. Holo, Comment,
Defendant Class Actions: The Failure of Rule 23 and a Proposed Solution, 38 UCLA L.
REv. 223, 238 n.64 (1990); David E. Rigney, Annotation, Permissibility of Action Against
a Class of Defendants Under Rule 23(b)(2) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 A.L.R.
FED. 263, 275-76 (1987) (discusses Paxman, but not Thompson, as barring (b)(2) defendant
class certification.).
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members of the class be identical.5 7 The reasoning of both the
Fourth and Sixth Circuit suggest that "identicality" 5 is what the
courts were looking for among the proposed defendant classes. 9
Surely there was a common question of law and fact in regard to
the constitutionality of the leave policies being challenged. In order
for a defendant class to be certified, both courts would have
required that each leave policy be identical. 60
The Fourth Circuit, in Bazemore v. Friday,6 1 retreated from the
far reach of its own prior decision stating that its decision in
Paxman and the decision of the Sixth Circuit in .Thompson held
that defendant class certification is not appropriate under subsec-
tion (b)(2) when the members of the defendant class are not acting
under a common directive, apparently agreeing with the latter of
the interpretations of Thompson previously suggested.62 Therefore,
though cited for the literalist proposition, Thompson does not
actually hold that a defendant class may not be certified under
subsection (b)(2), 63 and the Fourth Circuit has stated that is not
57. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
58. This new requirement of a higher degree of commonality or typicality, "identi-
cality," could limit subsection (b)(2) defendant class certification to situations where class
certification was unnecessary. Pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d), an order granting an
injunction is binding upon the parties, "and upon those persons in active concert or
participation with the[m] . . . ." See Terrell, supra note 22, at 166.
The scope of the requirements of commonality and typicality in the context of subsection
(b)(2) defendant class certification are beyond the extent of this Article and await a latter
day. In the context of plaintiff class certification, these requirements impose a standard
that is substantially less than that of a binding link or common directive.
59. Because this limitation on the breadth of defendant class certification is apparently
imposed upon subsection (b)(2) as result of the dilemma with the language, those decisions
will continue to be considered among the literalist approach even though, as discussed at
infra notes 63-64, the cases do not hold that subsection (b)(2) is inapplicable to defendant
class certification.
60. If "identicality" were a requirement for certification, defendant class certification
would not be available as a solution to the problem posed by the decision in Martin v.
Wilks. The persons sought to be made a defendant class in order to fashion a decree that
is binding upon all parties would rarely, if ever, possess identical legal and factual questions.
See Strickler, supra note 6, at 1596; see also, supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
61. Bazemore v. Friday, 751 F.2d 662 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 474 U.S. 978
(1985), aff'd in part, vacated in part, on other grounds, 478 U.S. 385 (1986) (per curiam).
62. 751 F.2d at 669-70. In Bazemore, the court upheld the denial of certification of
a defendant class sought under subsection (b)(l)(B). Id. Therefore, the relevant discussion
arguably is dicta.
63. Thompson v. Board of Educ., 709 F.2d 1200 (6th Cir. 1983), has been cited as
supporting subsection (b)(2) defendant class certification in the "limited circumstance"
where the individual members of the proposed defendant class "are all acting to enforce
'a locally administered state statute or similar administrative policies.'" Akron Center for
Reproductive Health v. Rosen, 110 F.R.D. 576, 579 (N.D. Ohio 1986) (citing Thompson)
(quoting Greenhouse v. Greco, 617 F.2d 408, 413 n.6 (5th Cir. 1980)).
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what Paxman meant. Apparently, if the defendants have what has
been referred to as a "juridical link," (b)(2) defendant class
certification is appropriate according to the Fourth and Sixth
Circuit.6 Curiously, the same courts which insisted upon reading
subsection (b)(2) literally were willing to write a requirement into
the rule that clearly is not there and does not even address, let
alone resolve the dilemma from which it was spawned. 65 Though
a juridical link may exist among the members of the proposed
defendant class, the language of subsection (b)(2) remains arguably
inapplicable to defendant classes.
The literalist approach to the language dilemma reached its
culmination in the Seventh Circuit's decision in Henson v. East
Lincoln Township which relied upon Paxman and Thompson and
held that subsection (b)(2) does not provide for certification of a
defendant class. 6 Henson was a suit brought by a plaintiff class67
64. See Miller, supra note 9, at 1394-98, for a discussion of the juridical link approach
of (b)(2) defendant class certification. Miller argues that "[oinly if such a 'juridical link'
is present is certification of a defendant class appropriate." Id. at 1401.
65. Writing the juridical link requirement into subsection (b)(2) when it is clearly not
there, would be the same type of impermissible judicial intervention of which the literalists
complain when criticizing those cases that have ignored the language dilemma and certified
(b)(2) defendant classes. The first determination is whether subsection (b)(2) provides for
defendant class certification. If not, defendant class certification should not be created by
the courts through the imposition of the juridical link device, which is not included in
subsection (b)(2). If it provides for defendant class certification, certification should not
be limited by the courts to only juridically linked defendants in a manner not intended by
subsection (b)(2).
The concept of juridical link is a variation on the theme of "identicality." The concerns
that gave rise to the former approach also are more properly addressed under the prere-
quisites of Rule 23(a)(2), (3), and (4): commonality of questions of law or fact, typicality
of defenses, or possibly adequacy of representation. These three requirements often merge
when considering the overriding principle of whether the rights of unnamed class members
are adequately represented and protected. See Rosen, 110 F.R.D. at 581-82 (N.D. Ohio
1986) (citing General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157-58 n.13 (1982)) (discussing the
merger of the concepts of commonality, typicality and adequacy of representation in the
context of subsection (b)(2) defendant class certification).
There may be situations in which the requirements of Rule 23(a) are met, but the
proposed defendant class members do not meet the juridical link test. Certification should
not be denied in that situation if subsection (b)(2) provides for certification of a defendant
class.
66. Henson v. East Lincoln Township, 814 F.2d 410, 416 (7th Cir.), cert. granted,
484 U.S. 923, and deferral granted, 484 U.S. 1001 and 1057 (1987).
An almost identical suit to Henson was filed in the northern half of the state and is still
pending, Rodriquez v. Township of DeKalb, No. 85-C-20190 (N.D. Ill. filed 1980). Though
the case has a 1985 case number, it was actually filed in 1980 and renumbered upon being
transferred from the Eastern Division of the Northern District of Illinois to the Western
/Division of the Northern District of Illinois. In Rodriquez, defendant class certification
was originally denied in an unpublished order dated October 31, 1984. The denial was
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of general assistance recipients and applicants68 against a proposed
defendant class of the 770 townships in downstate Illinois. 69 The
proposed defendant class sought certification under subsection
(b)(2).70 Mr. Henson brought suit in order to obtain the compliance
of the defendant class with the Seventh Circuit's previous decision
in White v.Roughton.7 1 White had held that the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment required a local unit of government
in Illinois to operate a general assistance program pursuant to
based on a problem with typicality under subsection (a)(3), and the court indicated that
defendant certification was proper under subsection (b)(2). Upon refinement and narrowing
of the claims presented, a (b)(2) defendant class was certified in an unpublished order
dated January 28, 1986. After the decision in Henson, the court entered an order on April
6, 1988, which decertified the defendant class. Plaintiffs sought interlocutory appeal of
that order to the Seventh Circuit for the purpose of making a motion pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1254(3) to certify the question for review by the Supreme Court in order that the
matter could be consolidated with Henson, which at that time had been deferred by
agreement of the parties. The Seventh Circuit denied the motion for interlocutory appeal.
Rodriquez v. Township of DeKalb, No. 88-8024 (7th Cir. May 24, 1988).
67. The plaintiff class was defined as all past, present, and/or future recipients of
general assistance who have been or will be denied due process in regard to their application,
receipt, or termination of general assistance. 814 F.2d at 411-12.
68. Iti. REv. STAT. ch. 23, 1-1 to -6 and 6-1 to -1.9 (1988). General assistance in
Illinois is a program designed by the state legislature to provide financial assistance in an
amount necessary to meet basic life maintenance requirements of persons who, in general,
are not categorically eligible to receive welfare assistance from any other state or federal
program. Though the statutory scheme establishes a basic framework for eligibility and
levels of assistance, each unit of local government that administers a general assistance
program, most often a township, is given almost total autonomy in its administration of
its general assistance program. General assistance is financed through county taxation. Only
if a township obtains state funding for its program must it submit to state-established
administrative practices.
69. The term "downstate" commonly is used in Illinois to refer to any part of the
state outside of Cook County, or perhaps outside of the City of Chicago. For purposes of
this Article, the term refers to the 65 counties that comprise the southern geographic half
of the state.
70. A defendant class similar to that sought to be certified in Henson was certified in
Hopson v. Schilling, 418 F. Supp. 1223 (N.D. Ind. 1976). The suit was a bilateral class
challenge to certain practices of Indiana township trustees in administering assistance under
Indiana's poor relief laws, IND. CODE ANN. §§ 12-2-1-1 to -2-1-39 (Burns 1973), a program
analogous to general assistance in Illinois, Hopson, 418 F. Supp. at 1227. The defendant
class was comprised of all township trustees (1,008) in Indiana. Id. at 1232. The practices
alleged to be constitutionally inadequate concerned the failure to maintain written standards
and the failure to provide notice of adverse action and appeal rights. Id.
71. white v. Roughton, 530 F.2d. 750, 754 (7th Cir. 1976) (per curiam). White was
an action brought by three individuals against an individual township, Champaign Township.
Two of the individuals had their receipt of general assistance terminated, and one had her
application for general assistance denied, without adequate written notice of the reason for
the action denying or terminating the assistance and without notice of the opportunity for
appeal of the adverse action. Id. at 751.
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established written standards and to utilize notice and hearing
procedures when granting, denying, or terminating assistance.
Though the law in the area had been decided, the townships were
not complying with the principles established in White. 2 Because
the individual members of the proposed defendant class had not
been included as parties in White, principles of res judicata did
not bind the townships to follow its decree. The potential stare
decisis effect of White was not adequate incentive for the townships
to willingly comply with the decision. 73 Faced with the opportunity
to provide enforcement of its earlier decree, the Seventh Circuit,
with Judge Posner writing for the majority of a divided panel,
declined to do so and ruled that the language of Rule 23(b)(2) did
not provide for the certification of a class of defendants. 74
The Seventh Circuit's reading of Thompson and Paxman is
interesting. The court notes that the Fourth Circuit in Bazemore
read Thompson and Paxman "narrowly," 75 yet the Seventh Circuit
states that both courts found (b)(2) defendant class certification
to be "impermissible." 76 Henson thus reads more into Paxman
than the Fourth Circuit has expressly stated was intended and
72. Henson alleged that the members of the proposed defendant class were each
administering its general assistance program without written standards and without consti-
tutionally sufficient notice and hearing procedures as required by White. Henson v. East
Lincoln Township, 814 F.2d 410, 411, 412 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 484 U.S. 923, and
deferral granted, 484 U.S. 1001 and 1057 (1987). That the desire for broad-based relief
against the defendant class was apparently not unwarranted appears from the answers to
discovery that were received from 525 of the 770 potential members of the proposed
defendant class, the entire number of townships responding to depositions upon written
question. The answers indicated that each, in some fashion, was not in compliance with
the principles announced in White. Id. at 412.
73. Because there were 770 townships involved, some very small, spread across the
entire downstate area, bilateral class litigation would seem an efficient and appropriate
mechanism to obtain compliance with the principles of White, obviating the need for 770
plaintiffs to file 770 separate actions. The action brought in Henson, is very similar to an
example discussed in Note, supra note 9, at 358-59. The Note concludes that such an action
is not maintainable as a defendant class action certified under Rule 23(b)(2) because of the
language dilemma of that subsection and argues that such an action should be maintained
under Rule 23(b)(1)(B). It is the language dilemma and a resolution thereof that is the
subject of this Article. For a discussion of the certification of a defendant class under Rule
23(b)(1), see supra note 17.
74. As discussed at supra note 8, Henson is presently pending before the Supreme
Court in deferral status. 484 U.S. 923, 1001 and 1057 (1987).
75. Henson, 814 F.2d at 413.
76. See id. at 413 ("But the only courts of appeal to discuss the permissibility of such
actions (there is decision but no discussion in Marcera) have held that they are not
permissible.").
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reads more into Thompson than the case actually held. 7
Henson reasons with the other literalist courts, relying almost
entirely upon the language dilemma and looking to the Advisory
Committee's notes, though the court elaborates upon the previous
literalist analysis.78 The Henson court's opinion does counter some
of the arguments which have been made by the functionalists.79
For example, the court rejects the argument that because the Rule
23(a) prerequisites state that a class may sue or be sued by a
representative party, defendant class actions are authorized under
all the following subsection (b) categories.80 The court also rejects
the argument that the use in subsection (b)(2) of the language "the
party opposing the class" instead of the word "defendant" resolves
the language dilemma. 81 Nevertheless, the Henson opinion suffers
from the same lack of in-depth, consistent reasoning as did Paxman
and Thompson, and, therefore, is not persuasive authority.8 2
77. Another troubling aspect of the Henson decision is the manner in which the court
referred to the plaintiffs. Throughout the opinion, the plaintiffs are not called by their
own names but instead by the name of the legal services organization which was representing
them, The Land of Lincoln Legal Assistance Foundation. The following excerpts illustrate
this aspect:
(1) "A downstate legal-aid bureau, the Land of Lincoln Legal Assistance, filed
the present suit in 1980." Id. at 411.
(2) "Henson (realistically, the Foundation) cannot fit his case under (b)(1) ......
Id. at 412-13.
(3) "The Foundation points out . . . ." Id. at 414.
(4) "To get all the relief this suit seeks the Foundation will have to find a
plaintiff in each of the other 770 townships . .. ." Id. at 415.
(5) "The Foundation paints with too vivid a palette." Id. at 415.
These references suggest that the court believed Henson did not present an actual case
or controversy, or perhaps that Mr. Henson was not a real party in interest. If such was
the case, the decision would more properly have been based upon such grounds, and an
invalidation of (b)(2) defendant class certification would not have been necessary.
78. It is interesting to note that although the opinion states without equivocation that
subsection (b)(2) does not provide for certification of a defendant class, there is equivocation
in its reasoning. In discussing that (b)(2) defendant classes have been certified in 45 cases,
the court states that some are distinguishable such as where the "members of the defendant
class were acting in concert." Id. at 413. This sounds like the same "narrowing" of
Paxman engaged in by the Fourth Circuit in Bazemore (see supra notes 61-62 and
accompanying text), and the same contradiction as the Sixth Circuit made in Thompson
(see supra notes 52-65 and accompanying text).
79. See generally infra notes 87-144 and accompanying text.
80. Henson, 814 F.2d at 413-14. The functionalist's argument will be referred to as
one of the "by hook" approaches. See infra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
81. Id. at 414. This will also be discussed as one of the "by hook" arguments. See
infra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
82. Senior District Judge William J. Campbell, sitting by designation, dissented in
part and concurred in part. Judge Campbell dissented from the absolute prohibition against
subsection (b)(2) defendant class actions, stating that the literalist approach of the majority
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As previously discussed, the concerns raised by Paxman, are
more properly rooted in commonality and typicality concerns.' 3
Those concerns may have been the proper area of inquiry for
Henson. Whereas Paxman sought to obtain injunctive relief against
a "type" of policy, Henson sought injunctive relief against oper-
ating a welfare program without any written policies or notice and
hearing procedures. The defenses of the members of the proposed
defendant class are less common or less typical than Paxman or
Thompson, for questions concerning whether individual defen-
dant's written procedures satisfied the dictates of due process could
become quite diverse. Thus, commonality or typicality might be
lost once the relief sought went beyond an injunction against
operating a welfare program without any written policies or notice
and hearing procedures.
Outside the Seventh Circuit, Henson has not been followed,4
but the issue cannot be considered to be settled. Henson remains
in deferral status before the Supreme Court,85 and the arguments
"borders on the simplistic." Id. at 420. He concurred in the denial of certification, finding
that the suit was "too unmanageable and the remedies too unfocused," without specifying
which provisions of Rule 23 were not met. Nevertheless, one could reasonably infer that
he was troubled with problems of commonality and typicality of the defenses of the
defendant class. Id.
83. See supra notes 47-51, 57-60 and accompanying text.
84. See, e.g., Luyando v. Bowen, 124 F.R.D. 52, 59 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (the court,
citing Marcera v. Chinlund, 595 F.2d 1231 (2d Cir. 1979), held that despite the contrary
authority of Paxman and Thompson, defendant class certification was appropriate under
subsection (b)(2)) but referred to Henson as "well-reasoned," and appeared to prefer the
literalist approach if the law in the Second'Circuit was not to the contrary); Follette v.
Vitanza, 658 F. Supp. 492, 507-09 (N.D.N.Y. 1987); DeAllaume v. Perales, 110 F.R.D.
299, 303-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
See also Frederick County Fruit Growers Ass'n v. Dole, 709 F. Supp. 242, 245 (D.D.C.)
(declining to certify a defendant class for reasons other than the difficulty with subsection
(b)(2), noting that Henson "has been given little precedential weight outside the Seventh
Circuit"), amend. denied, 703 F. Supp. 1021, 1032 (D.D.C. 1989) (considering the propriety
of (b)(2) defendant-class certification to be an "open question" in light of the Supreme
Court's grant of certiorari in Henson, and deferring consideration of certification of a
defendant class to await the Supreme Court's decision in that case, though incongruously
accepting the parties' stipulation to a related defendant class); United States v. Rainbow
Family, 695 F. Supp. 314, 319-21 (E.D. Tex. 1989); NBC v. Cleland, 697 F. Supp. 1204,
1215-17 (N.D. Ga. 1988); State v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 117 F.R.D. 349, 351-52 (E.D.N.Y.
1987) (noting the Second Circuit has certified (b)(2) defendant classes but declining to do
so because the proposed class of defendants was not so numerous that joinder was
impracticable, and therefore, the requirements of Rule 23(a)(1) were not met).
But see Williams v. State Bd. of Elections, 696 F. Supp. 1574, 1576 & n.2, 1577-78
(N.D. Ill. 1988), memorandum opinion, 696 F. Supp. 1563 (N.D. IUl. 1988) (following
Henson).
85. See supra note 14.
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advanced by the functionalists have not been any more persuasive
than those of the literalists. As Judge Campbell stated in his
dissent in Henson, "[tihe arguments in this area on both sides
are, at this point, stale and inconclusive ' 8 6
B. The Functionalists
The functionalists have overcome the dilemma of the language
to certify (b)(2) defendant classes by three different mechanisms:
"by hook," "by crook," and "by no look." 87 The mechanisms
will be analyzed in order of decreasing persuasiveness, yet increas-
ing frequency of use. None of the functionalist cases have utilized
an in-depth analysis that is entirely intellectually sound, nor have
any of the approaches utilized principles of statutory interpretation
to try and discern the intention of the drafters. Therefore, like the
literalist analysis, the functionalist analyses do not provide a sat-
isfactory resolution of the Rule 23(b)(2) language dilemma. 8
1. By Hook
One approach that has been taken to certify (b)(2) defendant
classes in the face of the language dilemma is to construct a
method of analysis that leads to the conclusion that, in spite of
the awkwardness of the language when applied to defendant clas-
ses, the subsection really was intended to provide for defendant
class certification. If sound arguments could be constructed, this
approach would have the greatest precedential value. Courts have
utilized three main "hooks" to accomplish this goal.
First, courts have recognized that a literal reading of subsection
(b)(2) would require that the party opposing the defendant class-
86. Henson v. East Lincoln Township, 814 F.2d 410, 420 (7th Cir.) (Campbell, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. granted, 484 U.S 923, and deferral granted,
484 U.S. 1001 and 1057 (1987).
87. The designations of the three mechanisms as "by hook," "by crook," and "by
no look," are those of the author. In Doss v. Long, 93 F.R.D. 112, 119 (N.D. Ga. 1981),
the court recognized that "three methods [have been employed] to overcome the language
problem: (1) ignore it ["by no look"]; (2) find conduct performed by the plaintiffs ["by
hook"]; (3) decide that Rule 23(b)(2) should cover defendant classes ["by crook"]." While
the author generally agrees with the first and third designations from Doss, the second
designation, "by hook," has utilized more variations than that recognized by the court.
Doss is most interesting in that, although it criticizes the reasoning, or lack thereof, of the
three approaches that it mentions, it then adopts one of them, "by crook," perhaps
transforming itself into the ultimate "by crook" case.
88. See Holo, supra note 56, at 239 (resolution of the intercircuit dispute as to whether
subsection (b)(2) provides for certification of a defendant class "must walt until the
Supreme Court decides Henson").
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the plaintiff class-has acted on grounds generally applicable to
the defendant class. Courts have found such actions by the plaintiff
class to have occurred. 89 For example, in a patent infringement
case brought against a defendant class of alleged patent infringers,
the court found the requisite action in the acts of obtaining patents,
notifying the alleged infringers, and threatening and bringing suit
to meet the requirements of subsection (b)(2).90 In an employment
discrimination case, the court found the requisite plaintiff action
in that the plaintiff class was forced by the illegal actions of the
defendant class to act in certain ways to become employed. 9' These
two examples are by no means exclusive. 92
This argument, however, is unpersuasive at best. It is the action
by the party opposing the class that is required to make injunctive
relief appropriate. 93 Though there may be action by the plaintiffs
in these cases, the plaintiffs are not seeking an injunction against
their own actionY4 Additionally, this analysis would give the plain-
tiffs the power to create a defendant class by threatening to bring
suit and insisting that defendants' conduct forced plaintiffs to act
in a certain fashion. 95 But to whom would the threat have had to
be made, or to how many members of the proposed class? Could
the plaintiffs determine the size and scope of the defendant class
by what defendants were chosen to receive their demand? If the
89. This method of analysis has been referred to as "plaintiff-based certification,"
Ancheta, supra note 9, at 314-15; and "the plaintiff-based approach," Terrell, supra note
22, at 159-60. It was also recognized as the second method of certification by the court in
Doss v. Long, 93 F.R.D. 112, 119 (N.D. Ga. 1981). See supra note 87.
90. Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Elecs., Inc. 285 F. Supp. 714, 723
(N.D. Ill. 1968).
91. Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, 469 F. Supp. 329, 415-16 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd
by an equally divided court, 648 F.2d 923 (3rd Cir. 1981) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982).
92. See, e.g., Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1125 n.1 (N.D. Tex. 1982), cert.
denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986) (homosexual plaintiffs brought suit seeking, in part, to enjoin
defendant class of all district county and city attorneys in Texas from enforcement of an
unconstitutional statute proscribing sexual intercourse between individuals of the same
gender); United States v. Trucking Employers, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 682, 691-92 (D.D.C. 1977)
(plaintiff class brought a bilateral class action against a defendant class of common carriers
of general commodity freight alleging discriminatory employment policies and practices in
the trucking industry); Kidd v. Schmidt, 399 F. Supp. 301, 303-04 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (threejudge panel) (plaintiff class brought a bilateral class action seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief against a defendant class of state officers authorized by statute to commit minors to
mental health facilities without a hearing); Research Corp. v. Pfister Associated Growers,
Inc., 301 F. Supp. 497, 500 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (plaintiff patent holder brought patent
infringement suit against a defendant class of patent infringers).
93. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
94. See Note, supra note 9, at 393-94.
95. For criticism of this approach, see Miller, supra note 9, at 1393.
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demand only needed to be made on the proposed defendant class
representative, could that representative, by its refusal to acquiesce
to the demand, create a defendant class that bound members who
were not recipients of the demand? The reasoning in support of
this argument is simply unworkable.
The second "hook" that courts have employed is to determine
that the language of subsection (a), "may sue or be sued as
representative parties," indicates that the troublesome language of
subsection (b)(2) was meant to include defendant class certifica-
tion.96 This argument was considered and rejected by Judge Posner
in Henson:
[b]ut the next word is "only," and is followed by a list of prerequisites
to maintaining a suit as a class action. The first sentence does not
authorize defendant classes but merely states limitations common to all
class action [sic]. Nowhere does it imply that defendant class actions
are possible under every subsection of Rule 23(b)."
The argument is not persuasive because it would have a general
provision of a statute controlling a specific provision, thereby
violating a long-established principle of statutory interpretation."
The final "hook" that has been employed by the functionalists
has been to find that the use of the language "the party opposing
the class" demonstrates that subsection (b)(2) was not meant to
exclude defendant class certification because if such exclusion were
intended, the word "defendant" would have been substituted for
the word "party." 99 The argument does make one curious as to
the choice of language by the drafters, but it is little more than
an inconclusive attempt at reconciling awkward language to an
intended result. 100
96. See, e.g., Leist v. Shawano County, 91 F.R.D. 64, 68 (E.D. Wis. 1981); United
States v. Trucking Employers, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 682, 691-92 (D.D.C. 1977); see also Note,
Defendant Class Actions, 91 IAv. L. Rv. 630, 634 (1978).
97. Henson v. East Lincoln Township, 814 F.2d 410, 413-14 (7th Cir.), cert. granted,
484 U.S. 923, and deferral granted, 484 U.S. 1001 and 1057 (1987).
98. See, e.g., HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 450 U.S. 1, 6 (1981) ("Iilt is a basic
principle of statutory construction that a specific statute ... controls over a general
provision ... particularly when the two are interrelated and closely positioned, both being
in fact parts of [the same statute] .... ).
99. See, e.g., United States v. Trucking Employers, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 682, 691 (D.D.C.
1977).
100. Henson also rejected this argument under the convoluted rationale that subsection
(b)(2) additionally provides for declaratory actions and that the parties in such an action
often are reversed. Henson, 814 F.2d at 414. This could be described as a "hook" to
defeat a "hook."
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2. By Crook
The second approach of the functionalists has been to acknowl-
edge the dilemma of the language, but to ignore the uncertainty
as to whether subsection (b)(2) provides for defendant class certi-
fication and to certify (b)(2) defendant classes because they are a
useful device.10' Though this approach has been referred to as the
most "intellectually honest"' 0 2 of the ways that courts have certi-
fied defendant classes because it does not resort to any language
games to create a "hook" for certification, its intellectual honesty
does not make up for it being devoid of intellectual persuasiveness.
Unfortunately, wishing something to be true, without something
more, does not make it so.' 03
The Second Circuit's decision in Marcera v. Chinlund'04 is per-
haps the most frequently cited "by crook" case. 0 5 Marcera is
often referred to as the prime example of the necessity for the
subsection (b)(2) defendant class action device to obtain broad-
based compliance with previously established legal obligations.06
In Marcera, the Second Circuit certified a defendant class "al-
though a literal reading of the rule might indicate otherwise."' 10 7
101. This approach has been referred to as the "instrumental approach," Terrell, supra
note 22, at 157-59; and "instrumental certification," Ancheta, supra note 9, at 312-14
(1985). It has been criticized as "certification by analogy." Miller, supra note 9, at 1394.
102. Doss v. Long, 93 F.R.D. 112, 119 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
103. From the personal experiences of the author on a wide variety of subjects-e.g.,
playing the lottery, deferring the aging process, my golf game, etc.
104. 595 F.2d 1231 (2d Cir. 1979) (plaintiff class of pretrial detainees throughout the
state of New York successfully brought a bilateral class suit against a defendant class of
county sheriffs who continued to deny contact visits with friends and family to pretrial
detainees even though the Second Circuit had previously held that due process prevented
such denial in Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333, 336-37 (2d Cir. 1974), aff'd, 527 F.2d
1041, 1043-44 (2d Cir. 1975)).
105. Marcera has been followed in Luyando v. Bowen, 124 F.R.D. 52, 59 (1989) (though
apparently grudgingly, see supra note 84); NBC v. Cleland, 697 F. Supp. 1204, 1213 (N.D.
Ga. 1988); Follette v. Vitanza, 658 F. Supp. 492, 508 (N.D.N.Y. 1987); State v. Anheuser-
Busch, Inc., 117 F.R.D. 349, 351-52 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (citing Marcera with approval but
declining to certify a defendant class because joinder was not impracticable, and, therefore,
the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1) was not met); DeAllaume v. Perales, 110
F.R.D. 299, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); and Doss v. Long, 93 F.R.D. 112, 119 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
106. See, e.g., Henson v. East Lincoln Township, 814 F.2d 410, 417-21 (7th Cir.)
(Campbell, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (explaining that a defendant class
was necessary in Marcera to force the noncooperative sheriff departments in New York
state to allow contact visits for pretrial detainees which the Second Circuit had previously
established as mandated by due process), cert. granted, 484 U.S. 923, and deferral granted,
484 U.S. 1001 and 1057 (1987).
107. Marcera, 595 F.2d at 1238. Marcera did engage in a thorough discussion of whether
the typicality and adequacy of representation requirements of Rule 23(a)(3) and (4) were
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Unfortunately, the court does not explain how it overcomes the
contrary literal reading.
Both before and after Marcera, courts in the face of the language
dilemma have certified defendant classes under such rationales as
that the certification is "in accordance with the interests of judicial
administration and justice which Rule 23 is meant to further"; 1°
that "[t]he importance of (b)(2) certification in a case such as this
is heightened because of the impossibility of obtaining make-whole
injunctive relief from employment discrimination against any par-
ticular defendant"; 109 or that "[the courts are simply unwilling to
deprive the plaintiff of this useful measure.""' 0 No matter how
compelling the plaintiffs' claims, or how useful the device, neither
should cause subsection (b)(2) to be extended beyond that for
which it was intended. These arguments are not of any precedential
value, and open the "by crook" functionalists to easy attack by
the literalists who claim that such courts are engaging in judicial
legislation by expanding the rule."'
This is not to say that "by crook" certification has always taken
place without any attempt by the courts at justification beyond
some recitation that the device is useful or necessary. Two very
similar arguments have been developed by courts that have engaged
in "by crook" certification. What is most interesting is that these
approaches overcome the language dilemma of subsection (b)(2)
by allowing certification in situations that are consistent with the
holdings of Paxman and Thompson."2
The first approach finds that the language dilemma is not a
barrier to certification when the suit is essentially an attack on the
constitutional validity and application of a statute, and the suit
does not seek relief against the members of the proposed defendant
class other than a declaration that the challenged statute is uncon-
stitutional and an injunction against its continued enforcement."'
met. Id. at 1238-39. If the Henson court had engaged in such an analysis, there may have
been no reason to reach the broad holding that defendant classes are not contemplated by
subsection (b)(2).
108. Redhail v. Zablocki, 418 F. Supp. 1061, 1066 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
109. Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, 469 F. Supp. 329, 416-17 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
110. Doss v. Long, 93 F.R.D. 112, 119 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
111. See, e.g. Henson v. East Lincoln Township, 814 F.2d 410, 416 (7th Cir.), cert.
granted, 484 U.S. 923, and deferral granted, 484 U.S. 1001 and 1057 (1987); Ancheta,
supra note 9, at 317 ("procedural requirements cannot be ignored or twisted to foster
substantive policies").
112. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
113. See, e.g., Hopson v. Schilling, 418 F. Supp. 1223, 1237-38 (N.D. Ind. 1976);
Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38, 52 (E.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 502 F.2d
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As with Paxman and Thompson, this approach erroneously hinges
its decision as to the applicability of subsection (b)(2) upon a
consideration that is appropriate only as to the commonality or
typicality requirements of Rule 23(a)(2) and (3). Commonality and
typicality of defenses in a bilateral class challenge to the uncon-
stitutionality of a statute are readily apparent, but this should not
be taken to mean that such situations are the only ones in which
commonality or typicality can be met in a bilateral class action. 1 4
Moreover, and as previously stated, this analysis certainly is not
1107 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Gibbs v. Garver, 419 U.S. 1039 (1974).
Hopson involved a constitutional challenge to Indiana's poor relief laws, IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 12-2-1-1 to -2-1-39 (Burns 1973), the equivalent of the general assistance program
which was the subject of Henson, and the court certified a defendant class similar to the
class that was denied certification in Henson. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
The court acknowledged the difficulty with the language, but certified the defendant class
noting that the action was a challenge to the "statute on its face," and, therefore, "the
defendant class is simply a procedural alternative to challenging the constitutionality of a
statute by suit against the state directly." Hopson, 418 F. Supp. at 1237-38.
Gibbs was an action to declare as unconstitutional Pennsylvania statutes that provided
for the repossession of motor vehicles pursuant to conditional sales contracts. The court
noted the language dilemma but certified a defendant class noting, "in the case at hand,
where the outcome will result solely in a declaration on the constitutionality of certain
statutes, there is no possibility of prejudice. The relief sought here is really against the
statute, not the defendants." Gibbs, 369 F. Supp. at 53.
114. See, e.g., Moe v. Dinkins, No. 80 Civ. 1577 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 1981) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file). Dinkins involved a bilateral class challenge, naming as the
defendant class all cities and towns in New York state, to a New York statute requiring
parental consent before a marriage license could be issued to certain persons. "The question
of the constitutional validity of the parental consent requirement of section 15 is common
to all members of the defendant class. The shared defense-that the statute is constitu-
tional-satisfies the requirement that the claims of the representative are typical of the
class." Id. at *7.
The named defendant apparently argued that defendant class certification was unnecessary
because if the statute was declared unconstitutional the clerks would not enforce it. The
court rejected the argument, unconvinced that if there was no defendant class that the
clerks would indeed cease to enforce the statute until each became bound by a decision
applicable to them by principles of stare decisis. Id. at *8. The court distinguished Galvan
v. Levine, 490 F.2d 1255 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 936 (1974), where defendant
class certification was held unnecessary because the defendant had represented to the court
that any judgment entered would be considered to have statewide effect and that the
challenged policy had already been rescinded. Id.
See also Cicero v. Olgiati, 410 F. Supp. 1080, 1098-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (a similar
argument by the defendant representative was also rejected because the defendant had not
made a sufficient representation to the court that any judgment would be given statewide
effect, but also because of considerations of avoiding the likelihood of mootness).
But see Schneider v. Margossian, 349 F. Supp. 741, 746 (D. Mass. 1972) (denying
defendant class certification in a statewide bilateral class challenge to certain prejudgment
attachment procedures, finding that "we are not persuaded by the prospect of other district
court clerks proceeding in disregard of our decision").
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relevant to an inquiry as to whether subsection (b)(2) was intended
to provide for defendant class certification. Rather, its relevance
is with regard to whether the class composition affords due process
to unnamed class members.
The second approach dismisses the problem with the language
when the court determines that a juridical link exists between the
defendants, that is, when the court finds there is some independent
legal relationship among the defendants.1 5 As previously discussed,
that is the actual holding of Thompson, and the expressed inter-
pretation by the Fourth Circuit of its holding in Paxman.116 The
juridical link inquiry, if relevant at all, like the constitutional
challenge to a statute approach, is only relevant to determine
whether the commonality of questions and typicality of defenses
requirements of subsection (a)(2) and (3) are met." 7 The fact that
the members of a proposed defendant class have a juridical link
cannot alter the meaning of subsection (b)(2) if the subsection does
not provide for defendant class certification, even though it does
make the (a)(2) and (3) inquiries easier.
Because the "by crook" approach to certification openly ac-
knowledges that it is ignoring the language dilemma in certifying
115. See La Mar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461, 465-70 (9th Cir. 1973);
DeAllaume v. Perales, 110 F.R.D. 299, 303-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("[A]-unified policy links
the members of the proposed defendant class .... In this situation, a defendant class is
appropriate."); Follette v. Vitanza, 658 F. Supp. 492, 507-08 (N.D.N.Y. 1987); Hopson v.
Schilling, 418 F. Supp. 1223, 1237-38 (N.D. Ind. 1976); Mudd v. Busse, 68 F.R.D. 522,
527-28 (N.D. Ind. 1975).
116. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
117. The determination of whether the proposed defendant class has a juridical link
was originally developed in two related lines of cases that wrestled with the problem posed
by bilateral class actions when the named plaintiffs did not each have a cause of action
against each member of the proposed defendant class. Weiner v. Bank of King of Prussia,
358 F. Supp. 684, 699-701 (E.D. Pa. 1973), considered this to be an insurmountable
standing problem, while La Mar, 489 F.2d at 465, considered this to present a typicality
problem that barred certification of the plaintiff class. La Mar created two exceptions to
its holding, the second being that if the defendants were juridically linked, the claims of
the named plaintiffs could be considered to be typical of the plaintiff class. Id. at 469-70.
If standing is more properly considered as a question of whether the plaintiff class
representative has standing to bring suit against the proposed defendant class representative,
the problem is overcome. To do otherwise defeats the basic concept of a class action
brought on behalf of many by a representative party.
The La Mar juridical links exception does provide a test that insures that typicality is
always met, but it artificially narrows typicality, which can also exist in some situations
where there is not a juridical link. The better approach is an independent analysis of
typicality in each case.
See Samuel M. Shafner, Comment, The Juridical Links Exception to the Typicality
Requirement in Multiple Defendant Class Actions: The Relationship Between Standing and
Typicality, 58 B.U. L. Rav. 492 (1978).
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a defendant class, it also does not provide an intellectually or
legally sound basis for certification that is able to silence the
literalists. Additionally, the latter two variations read into subsec-
tion (b)(2) are requirements that are not actually present in that
subsection and that result in requiring a heightened showing of
commonality and typicality that approaches "identicality."
3. By No Look
The greatest number of reported decisions that have certified a
(b)(2) defendant class have done so by making no mention of the
language dilemma and hence can be characterized as the "no
look" approach." 9 The body of case law which employs this
approach is greater than the combination of the literalist decisions
with the "by hook" and "by crook" functionalist decisions.
The decisions can be divided into three categories: 1) those that
have certified a defendant class without reference in the opinion,
to a specific Rule 23(b) category, though the relief sought indicates
that the defendant class was of a (b)(2) nature; 20 2) those that
have allowed (b)(2) defendant class certification by consent of the
parties;' 2' and, 3) those that have allowed (b)(2) defendant class
118. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
119. This approach is what the court in Doss v. Long, 93 F.R.D. 112, 119 (N.D. Ga.
1981) referred to as choosing to "ignore it." The "no look" approach also may be said
to have been referred to as "blind certification." Miller, supra note 9, at 1391-92 (criticizing
courts that have certified defendant classes without reference to one of the specific
subcategories of Rule 23(b)). The "no look" approach actually encompasses a far greater
body of case law than is represented by what the commentator referred to as blind
certification.
120. See, e.g., Brown v. Vance, 637 F.2d 272, 274 n.3 (5th Cir. 1981); Brown v. Scott,
602 F.2d 791, 795 (7th Cir. 1979); Callahan v. Wallace, 466 F.2d 59, 60 (5th Cir. 1972);
Clean Up '84 v. Heinrich, 582 F. Supp. 125, 127 (M.D. Fla. 1984); Coleman v. Stanziani,
570 F. Supp. 679, 680 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Walls v. Mississippi State Dep't of Pub. Welfare,
542 F. Supp. 281, 284 (N.D. Miss. 1982); Florida Businessmen for Free Enter. v. State,
499 F. Supp. 346, 350 (N.D. Fla. 1980); Hobson v. Pow, 434 F. Supp. 362, 365 (N.D.
Ala. 1977); Tucker v. City of Montgomery Bd. of Comm'rs, 410 F. Supp. 494, 499 (M.D.
Ala. 1976); Hernandez v. Danaher, 405 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Ill. 1975), rev'd on other
grounds, 431 U.S. 434, 438 (1977) (defendant class certification is apparent only from the
Supreme Court decision); West v. Cole, 390 F. Supp. 91, 93 n.1 (N.D. Miss. 1975); Lewis
v. Baxley, 368 F. Supp. 768, 772 n.4 (M.D. Ala. 1973); Union Pacific R.R. v. Woodahl,
308 F. Supp. 1002, 1008 (D. Mont. 1970); Hadnott v. Amos, 295 F. Supp. 1003, 1005
(M.D. Ala. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 394 U.S. 358 (1968).
121. See, e.g., Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1125 (N.D. Tex. 1982), appeal
dismissed, 743 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1984); Epps v. Levine, 457 F. Supp. 561, 563-64 (D.
Md. 1978); Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302, 1305 n.I (N.D. Il1. 1978), aff'd sub nom.
Wynn v. Carey, 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979); Wynn v. Scott, 448 F. Supp. 997, 1000
(N.D. II1. 1978), aff'd sub nom. Wynn v. Carey, 582 F.2d 1375 (7th Cir. 1978); Kane v.
Fortson, 369 F. Supp. 1342, 1343 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Rakes v. Coleman, 318 F. Supp. 181,
190 (E.D. Va. 1970).
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certification without addressing or discussing the language dilemma
in the reported decision. 122 Because these cases chose a "no look"
approach, they are of no precedential value in supporting (b)(2)
defendant classes apart from the fact that so many courts appar-
ently have believed that subsection (b)(2) provides for defendant
class certification. l 3
The functionalist commentators have not engaged in analysis
that is more persuasive or greater in depth than the courts.124
Therefore, the question as to whether a defendant class may be
properly maintainable under subsection (b)(2) remains unresolved.
Nevertheless, only in the Seventh Circuit is such certification
completely prohibited. In the Sixth and Fourth Circuits (b)(2)
certification is appropriate in the limited situation in which the
defendants are closely linked or are acting to enforce a state statute
or policy.
IV. A STATUTORY INTERPRETATION ANALYSIS OF RULE 23(b)(2)
Both schools have failed to conduct a thorough analysis applying
principles of statutory interpretation in order to reach a legally
defensible conclusion to the dilemma. Both schools have utilized
some of the established principles of statutory interpretation, but
in a piecemeal fashion. The literalist approach could be viewed as
an application of the plain meaning rule.'2 The "by hook" func-
122. See, e.g., Baksalary v. Smith, 591 F. Supp. 1279, 1281 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Harris v.
Graddick, 593 F. Supp. 128, 136-37 (M.D. Ala. 1984); Leist v. Shawano County, 91 F.R.D.
64, 68-69 (E.D. Wis. 1981); Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Pub. Welfare, 78
F.R.D. 413, 415 (E.D. Pa. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 442 U.S. 640 (1979); Kendall v.
True, 391 F. Supp. 413, 417 (W.D. Ky. 1975); Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 360 F.
Supp. 720, 722 n.3 (D. Conn. 1973); Danforth v. Christian, 351 F. Supp. 287, 289 (W.D.
Mo. 1972); Ferguson v. Williams, 330 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Miss. 1971), vacated on merits
and remanded, 405 U.S. 1036 (1972).
123. This indicates that certification of defendant classes, analogous to defendant class
certification under subsection (b)(2), must have been considered by the courts to have
existed prior to the enactment of Rule 23 in 1966; a court would not newly construct this
mechanism from the awkward language of the new Rule. Former Rule 23(a) provided for
a representative party of a class to "sue or be sued" in regard to a "right sought to be
enforced for or against the class." The suit then had to fit within one of the old categories
of "true," "hybrid," or "spurious." Rule 23 was amended in 1966 in large part due to
difficulties encountered with applying the old categories. Proposed Rules, supra note 3, at
98.
124. See Miller, supra note 9, at 1376-83. This Note is perhaps the best attempt at
analysis justifying (b)(2) defendant class certification. The Note examines the text, the
underlying policies and the history of Rule 23, but does so without establishing the relevance
and justification of each portion of the argument as would result from an analysis supported
by principles of statutory interpretation.
125. See infra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
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tionalists could be viewed as attempting to discern the meaning of
the statute by construing it as a whole.126 The "by crook" func-
tionalists could be said to be looking to the policy behind the
statute to derive its meaning. 127 But these principles of statutory
interpretation have been applied in a haphazard fashion in isolation
from each other and not by way of thorough, systematic analysis.
Both schools have been led astray by not first accurately addressing
the question of whether a plain meaning can be discerned from
the subsection.
A. No Plain Meaning of Subsection (b)(2) Is Discernable
Any analysis into the meaning and application of a statute
begins with a determination of whether a plain meaning can be
discerned.128 If the meaning is unambiguous, the analysis goes no
further unless a contrary meaning is evident from the legislative
history. 29 Each school has erred in concluding that the meaning
of subsection (b)(2) is plain. Given the length of time that the
language dilemma has gone unresolved, the division between the
circuits, the acceptance of certiorari by the Supreme Court, and
the many contortions of language in which the courts have engaged,
one would be hard pressed to conclude that subsection (b)(2)
contains an unambiguous expression as to whether certification of
a defendant class is permitted under its terms. Yet, apparently that
126. See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
127. See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
128. The application of the plain meaning rule is of universal acceptance as the starting
point in an analysis of the proper meaning of a statute. See, e.g., Bourjaily v. United
States, 483 U.S. 171, 178 (1987) ("It would be extraordinary to require legislative history
to confirm the plain meaning .... ") (emphasis in original); Caminetti v. United States,
242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) ("The meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought
in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain ... the sole function of
the courts is to enforce it according to its terms."); THEODORE SEDOWICK, A TREATISE ON
THE RUiS WInCH GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 194 (2d ed. 1874) ("The rule is, as we shall constantly see, cardinal
and universal, that if the statute is plain and unambiguous, there is no room for construction
or interpretation."); 2A NoRuuAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, §§
46.01-46.05 (4th ed. 1984); Frank H. Easterbrook, Legal Interpretations and the Power of
the Judiciary, 7 HARv. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 87 (1984); Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections
on the Reading of Statutes, 47 CoLUM. L. REV. 527 (1947).
129. See, e.g., United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981); Perrin v. United
States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979); 2A SiNGER, supra note 128, § 46.01, at 73. "One who
questions the application of the plain meaning rule to a provision of an act must show
either that some other section of the act expands or restricts its meaning, that the provision
itself is repugnant to the general purview of the act, or that the act considered in 'pad
materia' with other acts, or with legislative history of the subject matter, imports a different
meaning." Id. § 46.01, at 74 (footnotes omitted).
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is what many of the courts and commentators have done.
The literalist approach of Paxman and Thompson relies upon
the anomaly that the subsection language requires the action of
the plaintiff to constitute the basis for the injunctive relief to
conclude that there is an unambiguous expression that (b)(2) de-
fendant class certification is not contemplated.' 30 That analysis
goes too far. The anomaly serves to make the subsection ambig-
uous, but it does not make it a clear expression of prohibition
against defendant class certification for two reasons.
First, the use of the word "party," as opposed to "defendant,"
raises a question as to the drafters' choice of that usage, when
substituting "defendant" would have made the subsection clearly
inapplicable to defendant classes.13' Second, even if the immediately
preceding argument is rejected, as has been done, 32 a basic tenet
of statutory interpretation requires that provisions of a statute not
be read in isolation, but rather be read in the context of the statute
as a whole. 33 Reading subsection (b)(2) in light of the "sue or be
sued" language 34 of Rule 23(a) finds the two provisions in conflict
and results in the creation of an ambiguity. 35
130. Paxman v. Campbell, 612 F.2d 848, 854 (4th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1129 (1981); Thompson v. Board of Educ., 709 F.2d 1200, 1203-04 (6th Cir.
1983). As previously discussed, the actual holdings of Paxman and Thompson, as expressed
in Bazemore v. Friday, 751 F.2d 662, 669-70 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 474 U.S. 978
(1985), aff'd in part, vacated in part, on other grounds, 478 U.S. 385 (1986), are that
subsection (b)(2) does provide for defendant class certification, but only in situations where
the members of the defendant class are acting under a common directive.
This same approach was taken by the leading literalist commentators. See 7A WRIGHT
ET AL, supra note 12, § 1775, at 21-22; Ancheta, supra note 9, at 315-17; Note, supra
note 9, at 390-96.
131. This argument has been used by the leading functionalist commentator to reach
the conclusion that the language of subsection (b)(2) supports defendant class certification.
Miller, supra note 9, at 1377. This argument also goes too far. It serves to establish that
the subsection is ambiguous but not to establish a meaning that can be fairly considered
to be plain.
132. 3B MooRE & KEINmr y, supra note 12, 23.40[6], at 23-285.
133. See, e.g., Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962) ("We believe it
fundamental that a section of a statute should not be read in isolation from the context
of the whole Act, and that in fulfilling bur responsibility in interpreting legislation, 'we
must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but [should] look to
the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy."') (citing Mastro Plastics
Corp. v. Labor Ed., 350 U.S. 270, 285 (1955)) (quoting United States v. Boisdori's Heirs,
49 U.S. (8 How.) 113, 122 (1850)); 2A SINGER, supra note 128, § 46.05, at 90 ("A statute
is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections *and is animated by one general purpose
and intent .... [E]ach part or section should be construed in connection with every other
part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole.").
134. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
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As previously discussed, this argument has been used by the
"by-hook" functionalists to find that subsection (b)(2) provides
for defendant class certification.' 36 This argument, too, has prop-
erly been rejected 37 because it also goes too far. It is useful in
establishing that the subsection in question is ambiguous, but it is
overreaching to say that the argument establishes a plain meaning
that provides for defendant class certification. The anomaly of the
language is ever present. 38 Nevertheless, the Rule 23(a) "sue or
be sued" language is a death knell to the literalists finding of their
own plain meaning. Although the language of Rule 23(a) is of
general application, and that of subsection (b)(2) is of specific
application, which could lead to the conclusion that the former
cannot control over the latter, 1 9 the scheme of the Rule as a whole
is that specific exceptions to principles of general application are
specifically enumerated. 140 Subsection (b)(2) makes no mention that
it acts as an exception to Rule 23(a). A fair reading can only
conclude that subsection (b)(2) does not have a plain meaning,
but, rather, is ambiguous' 4' and warrants the next level of statutory
analysis, an analysis of the relevant legislative history.
42
Though the Seventh Circuit in Henson sought to engage in an
analysis of statutory interpretation, including an analysis of whether
the subsection had a plain meaning, its analysis is flawed. In one
sentence the court states that the rule does not provide for defen-
136. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text; see also, Miller, supra note 9, at
1377 (finding that "inferences drawn from the rule's text create a strong presumption that
(b)(2) authorizes defendant class certification").
137. See Henson v. East Lincoln Township, 814 F.2d 410, 414 (7th Cir.), cert. granted,
484 U.S. 923, and deferral granted, 484 U.S. 1001 and 1057 (1987); see also infra note
143.
138. See infra note 143 and accompanying text.
139. See 2A SiNoER, supra note 128, § 46.05, at 92 ("Where there is an inescapable
conflict between general and specific terms or provisions of a statute, the specific will
prevail.").
140. See FED. R. C-v. P. 23(c)(2) (specifically limiting the notice requirements therein
to classes certified under subdivision (b)(3)); FED. R. Ciw. P. 23(c)(3) (specifying that
provisions contained therein are specifically applicable to classes certified under either (b)(1)
and (b)(2) or under (b)(3)).
141. The remaining argument of the "by hook" functionalists which looks to action
by the plaintiffs to solve the language dilemma, does not warrant further discussion except
to note that it too suffers from trying to make an ambiguous provision plain by a contorted
analysis. The analysis simply establishes that subsection (b)(2) is ambiguous. See supra
notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
142. After a court has determined that a statute is ambiguous, it must then look to
relevant legislative history to discern the intention of the drafters. See, e.g., SEDowxCK,
supra note 128, at 194-99; 2A SNGER, supra note 128, § 48.01, at 278 ("Usually a court
looks into the legislative history to clear up some statutory ambiguity.").
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dant class certification, apparently finding a plain meaning, yet
also states that the rule contains ambiguous language.1 43 The two
are incongruous. If there is an ambiguity, the meaning cannot be
plain, and further analysis is required. Additionally, although the
Henson court includes an examination of the language of the
subsection and makes mention of the drafting history, it does so
looking for an unequivocal expression that defendant class certi-
fication is authorized by subsection (b)(2) rather than conducting
the examination for the purpose of determining the meaning of
an ambiguous statute. 144 Apparently, for the Henson court, an
ambiguity in a statute signals the ending point of statutory analysis.
B. The Legislative (Drafting) History of Subsection (b)(2) 145
The drafting history does not address, much less answer the
question of whether subsection (b)(2) provides for certification of
143. See Henson v. East Lincoln Township, 814 F.2d 410, 414 (7th Cir.), cert. granted,
484 U.S. 923, and deferral granted, 484 U.S. 1001 and 1057 (1987) ("[P]laintiff argued
that nevertheless the language [the drafters] used brought such actions (perhaps inadver-
tently) under the rule. It does not, as we have shown; so we need not decide whether
draftsmen of rules or statutes should ever be held to meanings that are inadvertent-the
product of ambiguities inherent in the language."). The analysis in which Henson refuses
to engage is precisely the analysis that must be conducted to resolve the language dilemma
of subsection (b)(2).
144. See id. at 416 ("Nothing in the structure or history of the rule suggests that it
was intended as a broad delegation to the courts of a power that judges would domesticate
by bringing to bear limiting principles found elsewhere in Rule 23, or in the Constitution,
or in the Judicial Code .... We are loath to embark on these uncharted and, as it seems
to us, perilous seas without some indication that the framers of Rule 23 would have wanted
us to do so; there is no such indication.").
These passages additionally indicate the court's concern that bilateral class actions are
"unwieldy, or worse." Id. at 415. The court hypothesized a bilateral, nationwide class
action that could become "a monstrous perversion of the principles of civil procedure."
Id. at 416. Though noting that Rule 23 contained provisions to control such a "monster,"
such as the creation of subclasses, Rule 23(c)(4), or the requiring of notice to class members
for the "fair conduct of the action," Rule 23(d)(2), the court stated that "the rule does
not set forth the explicit limitations that would be necessary and appropriate .... I" Id. at
416. The court is not only seeking an unambiguous authorization for (b)(2) defendant class
certification, it is also seeking the rule to provide guidance in the certification of defendant
classes under subsection (b)(2) that it does not provide for a plaintiff class under any of
the three categories, or of a defendant class under subsection (b)(1) or (b)(3). The instructions
that the court seeks cannot be generalized, and the rule seeks to establish the framework
within which the court can tailor whatever orders are necessary to protect the members of
the class.
The concerns of the court are rooted in due process concerns in group litigation of
binding absent members of a class to judgment. Those concerns have previously been
resolved. See, e.g., Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 43 (1940).
145. The term legislative history is somewhat of a misnomer in this context, because
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a defendant class. 14 In the entire body of the history, there is no
discussion of whether defendant classes may be certified under
subsection (b)(2); there is also no discussion indicating that defen-
dant class certification is not authorized. 147 The only logical con-
clusion is that expressed by Newberg: "[I]n all probability, the
Rules Advisory Committee never focused on how the amended
rule would be applied when a defendant class suit was sought. 14
The analysis cannot stop simply because subsection (b)(2) defendant
class certification may not have been expressly contemplated. The
analysis must resolve what Henson said it did not need to decide-
whether the Rule can be held to have an inadvertent meaning. 149
Further, Henson unfairly states the nature of the inquiry, for
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not drafted by a legislature as such. Congress has
delegated to the Supreme Court the power to promulgate all necessary procedural rules
and practices involving the district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988). The actual drafting
had been assigned to an advisory committee consisting of jurists, practitioners, and legal
scholars. See Appointment of Committee to Draft Unified System of Equity and Law
Rules, 295 U.S. 774 (1935). Once promulgated, the rules are reported by the Court to
Congress by May 1 and take effect by Dec. 1 of the year in which the rule is reported,
unless Congress expressly disapproves. 28 U.S.C. § 2074.
Therefore, the term drafting history is more appropriate. Unfortunately, a drafting
history does not contain the same committee reports or floor debates that are the main
tools of statutory interpretation.
146. Because of the process by which the rules are drafted and adopted, the sources
are few. See supra note 145. In their entirety they consist of four sources: The Reports of
the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States (1965-1967), which only
recite the process by which the changes in the rules are put into effect but does not discuss
the substance of the rule changes; Proposed Rules, supra note 3, at 69, 98-99, in which
the discussion does little more than track the language of the ambiguous rule, see supra
note 43; Reports and Papers of the Judicial Conference of the United States (1965); and,
a law review article written by the official reporter to the Advisory Committee, Benjamin
Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARv. L. REv. 356, 375-400 (1967).
147. The leading functionalist commentator concludes "[t]here is little reason to doubt
that Rule 23's drafters intended subdivision (b)(2) to authorize defendant class actions."
Miller, supra note 9, at 1380. This conclusion is based upon a discerned policy of Rule 23
to promote judicial economy and encourage enforcement of statutory and constitutional
norms. One cannot argue that such policies were behind the drafting of Rule 23, but to
extrapolate those policies to conclude the drafter's intentions on (b)(2) defendant class
certification when none are expressed is an act more rooted in speculation than in
interpretation.
148. 1 NawBEao, supra note 3, § 4.18, at 305. Because the Advisory Committee never
considered the application of subsection (b)(2) to defendant class certification, the "by
crook" functionalist approach is somewhat more justified. See supra notes 101-11 and
accompanying text. This approach can be viewed as looking beyond the dilemma of the
language to seek an accord between the language and the policies behind Rule 23. As
discussed at supra notes 146-47, the generalized nature of the expression of the policies
makes this approach inconclusive.
149. See supra notes 143-44.
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finding that defendant class actions are maintainable under Rule
23(b)(2) would be giving the subsection an inadvertent meaning
only if a device analogous to (b)(2) defendant class certification
did not exist prior to the adoption of the amended version of Rule
23 in 1966. If an analogous device did exist, it must then be
decided whether the "inadvertence" of the Advisory Committee
in not expressly addressing the relationship between the amended
Rule 23, particularly subsection (b)(2), and defendant class actions
should serve to overrule an existing procedural device.-1 0
C. Rule 23(b)(2) Defendant Class Certification Should not be
Overruled by Inadvertence
It is a fundamental principle of statutory interpretation that a
revision of a statute will not be given a construction that repeals
or overrules prior law without an unambiguous expression of
intention by the drafters to do so.151 As is often stated, repeals by
implication are not favored.152 Construing subsection (b)(2) to be
150. It is the refusal to conduct this analysis that most severely flaws Henson. It is
also the greatest weakness of the literalist approach in general, which determines that the
subsection does not expressly provide for defendant class certification and stops the inquiry
after an apparent determination that the meaning of the subsection is plain. See, e.g.,
Ancheta, supra note 9, at 317 ("[G]iven the language of subdivision (b)(2), the literal
interpretation appears to be the correct view regarding Rule 23(b)(2)'s applicability to
defendant class actions."). The meaning, however, is not plain. Therefore, further inquiry
is warranted.
151. See, e.g., Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144, 153 (1924) ("In adopting the language
used in an earlier act, Congress must be considered to have adopted also the construction
given by this Court to such language, and made it a part of the enactment."); McDonald
v. Hovey, 110 U.S. 619, 629 (1884) ("A change of phraseology in a revision will not be
regarded as altering the law where it had been well settled by plain language in the statutes,
or by judicial construction thereof, unless it is clear that such was the intent.") (quoting
SEDowicic, supra note 128, at 229); Ruth v. Eagle-Picher Co., 225 F.2d 572, 575 (10th
Cir. 1955) ("It is a well-settled rule of construction that where the entire legislation affecting
a particular subject matter has undergone revision and consolidation by codification the
revised sections will be presumed to bear the same meaning as the original sections.");
Champ v. Brown, 266 N.W. 94, 97 (Minn. 1936) ("'It is a generally accepted rule of
statutory construction that a revision of existing statutes is presumed not to have changed
their meaning, even if there be phraseological alterations, unless an intention to change
clearly appears from the language of the revised statute when considered in connection
with the subject-matter of the act and its legislative history."'); Libby v. Pelham, 166 P.
575, 577 (Idaho 1917) ("Changes made by a revision of the statutes will not be regarded
as altering the law, unless it clear that such was the intention, and, if the revised statute
is ambiguous or is susceptible of two constructions, reference may be had to prior statutes
for the purpose of ascertaining the intention.").
152. E.g., Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 474 U.S. 518, 523-24 (1986) ("It is,
of course, a cardinal principle of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not
favored") (quoting Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co. 426 U.S. 148, 154 (1976)). See also,
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inapplicable to defendant class actions would amount to such a
repeal, but not by implication, rather by inadvertence, if at the
time subsection (b)(2) was adopted defendant classes were being
certified under old Rule 23 that were analogous to those which
would be certified under the new subsection.
The proper time frame of the inquiry is critical. Much has been
written tracing the origins of the modern class action to early
English common law,' 51 and it has been stated that in the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries defendant classes were as common as
plaintiff classes.15 4 One commentator has utilized an historical
analysis to conclude that subsection (b)(2) permits defendant class
certification,155 but inexplicably ends the analysis for all practical
purposes in 1853.156 Though the historical tracing is of intellectual
interest, 57 the relevant inquiry is whether inadvertence of the
Blanchette v. Connecticut Gen. Ins. Corp., 419 U.S. 102, 133 (1974); Amell v. United
States, 384 U.S. 158, 165-66 (1966); Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 358
(1963); United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939).
The above cases arise in the context where a court is confronted with two acts upon the
same subject which are in apparent conflict. This is not the precise case at hand, but the
principle is still equally applicable. A new statute should not be construed to overrule or
abrogate a long standing device of civil procedure without mention or even consideration.
153. See, e.g., STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITGATION TO THE MODERN
CLASS ACTION (1988); ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, SoME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY (1950); William
Weiner & Delphine Szyndrowski, The Class Action, From the English Bill of Peace to
Federal Rule 23: Is There a Common Thread?, 8 WHrITIER L. Rnv. 935 (1987); Stephen
C. Yeazell, From Group Litigation to Class Action, Part I: The Industrialization of Group
Litigation, 27 UCLA L. REv. 514 (1980); Stephen C. Yeazell, From Group Litigation to
Class Action, Part II: Interest, Class, and Representation, 27 UCLA L. REv. 1067 (1980);
Stephen C. Yeazell, Group Litigation and Social Context: Toward a History of the Class
Action, 77 CoLUM. L. REv. 866 (1977); Raymond B. Marcin, Searching for the Origin of
the Class Action, 23 CATH. U. L. REv. 515 (1974).
154. Yeazell, supra note 153, at 880.
155. Miller, supra note 9, at 1380-83. The commentator discusses Professor Yeazell's
arguments that early group litigation devices are distinguishable from the modern defendant
class device and concludes that the arguments for distinction are unconvincing. Id. at 1382
n.85. Because, as this Article will discuss, the proper inquiry is whether defendant class
actions analogous to subsection (b)(2) defendant class actions existed at the time of the
adoption of the present Rule 23, the author does not feel compelled to enter that debate.
156. Id. at 1381 (citing Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1853), as the
earliest American defendant class action). Swormstedt was a bilateral class action pitting
the northern and southern factions of the Methodist Episcopal Church against each other.
The Court discussed the utilization of defendant class actions to serve the interests of
fairness and convenience and relied heavily upon JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUTY
PLE.ADINoS §§ 97-135 (2d ed. 1840) to endorse defendant classes where appropriate.
Again, one could be tempted to enter a potential argument that the Court in Swormstedt
impermissibly exceeded the scope of the then existing rule which provided for group
litigation, Equity Rule 48, 42 U.S. (1 How.) Ivi (1842), by binding absent class members
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drafters of present Rule 23 in failing to consider the applicability
of subsection (b)(2) to defendant class certification should lead to
a result as in Henson. The inquiry must focus on whether the
device existed in 1966, the time Rule 23 was adopted.",, If the
devise existed, it should not be overruled by inadvertence.
The predecessor to Rule 23, adopted in 1938, interestingly con-
tained the same "sue or be sued" language as the 1966 revision,
thus indicating that defendant classes were intended. 59 Examination
of the pre-amendment cases shows that dMfendant classes were
to the judgment contrary to the language of the rule:
Where the parties ... are very numerous, and cannot, without manifest incon-
venience and oppressive delays ... be brought before it, the court ... may
dispense with making all of them parties ... and may proceed ... having
sufficient parties before it to represent all the adverse interests .... But in such
cases the decree shall be without prejudice to the rights and claims of all the
absent parties.
Id. (emphasis added).
But such argument need not sidetrack the truly relevant inquiry, what was the state of
law at the time that present Rule 23 was adopted? Nevertheless, it is interesting to note
that Swormstedt was cited by the Advisory Committee's Note to the original Rule 23
(1937). See Miller, supra note 9, at 1382 n.89 (citing 3B Moore's Federal Practice 23-15
(1982) (reprinting Advisory Committee's Note).
157. Apparently the drafters of Rule 23 were also aware of the origins of group
litigation in early English common law. See Miller, supra note 9, at 1383 n.90 (citing
Kaplan, supra note 146, at 376).
158. Professor Yeazell has argued that the decision in Henson is wrong because of both
the historical tradition of litigation involving collective defendants and the existence of
contemporary forms of litigation, such as bankruptcy, that involve collective defendants.
Yeazell, supra note 44, at 46. As this Article has discussed, the appropriate inquiry is
whether a directly analogous procedural device existed under old Rule 23 at the time that
subsection (b)(2) was drafted. The fact that litigation against defendant collectives has
existed and does exist does not establish conclusively that defendant class actions are
authorized by subsection (b)(2).
159.
FED. R. Crv. P. 23 (1938) provided:
(a) Representation. If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make
it impracticable to bring them all before the court, such of them, one or more,
as will fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on behalf of all, sue
or be sued, when the character of the right sought to be enforced for or against
the class is:
(1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of a primary
right refuses to enforce that right and a member of the class thereby becomes
entitled to enforce it;
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims which
do or may affect specific property involved in the action; or
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the
several rights and a common relief is sought.
The language also appears in Equity Rule 38, 226 U.S. 659 (1912), the predecessor to
FED. R. Crv. P. 23 (1938): "one or more may sue or defend for the whole .... "
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certified under old Rule 23 in actions brought to obtain injunctive
and declaratory relief in situations that are analogous to those
which would be maintainable under subsection (b)(2). 160 Most
notable are two cases from the State of Alabama in the mid-1960s
in which unruly state officials were certified as a defendant class
under the predecessor rule.161 In both cases, bilateral classes were
certified in actions seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against
a defendant class, the analogous situation to a defendant class
certified under subsection (b)(2).16 2 Each case received Supreme
Court affirmation.1 63
160. See generally Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683 (1961) (an
action brought by the United States against certain individuals and a defendant class of
members of the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) to
enjoin alleged antitrust violations); Calagaz v. Calhoon, 309 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1962) (an
action for declaratory and injunctive relief brought against a nationwide defendant class
of union members); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Central of Georgia Ry. Co., 229
F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1956) (an employer's action for declaratory and injunctive relief brought
against a defendant class of employee union members); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Loco-
motive Firemen and Enginemen, 148 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1945) (an action alleging racial
discrimination and seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against a defendant class);
Toombs v. Forston, 241 F. Supp. 65 (N.D. Ga. 1965), aff'd, 384 U.S. 210 (1966) (an
action brought against a defendant class for declaratory and injunctive relief to cause
reapportionment of the state legislature); Stout v. Hendricks, 228 F. Supp. 568 (S.D. Ind.
1964) (an action challenging legislative reapportionment as violative of equal protection
brought against a defendant class of state and county officials).
It is important to note that not all of the above actions name members of an unincor-
porated association as the defendant class. Otherwise, one might argue that these actions
reflect a certification of a defendant class that is analogous to that provided for in FED.
R. Cirv. P. 23.2, and not subsection (b)(2).
161. See Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327, 329 (M.D. Ala. 1966), aff'dper curiam,
390 U.S. 333 (1968) (an action seeking to declare as unconstitutional and enjoin the
enforcement of certain practices and statutes of Alabama which provided for the segregation
by race of detainees in any state, county, or city penal institution); Sims v. Frank, 208 F.
Supp. 431, 433 (M.D. Ala. 1962), aff'd sub nom. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)
(a challenge to the apportionment of the Alabama legislature seeking injunctive and
declaratory relief). The court in Henson cites Washington, but dismisses the case because
it "had been filed before the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 that added (b)(2) (though it
was decided after)." Henson v. East Lincoln Township, 814 F.2d 410, 413 (7th Cir.), cert.
granted, 484 U.S. 923, and deferral granted, 484 U.S. 1001 and 1057 (1987). This reference
by Henson to Washington clearly demonstrates how the court led itself astray by not
applying established principles of statutory interpretation.
162. In Washington, a defendant class was certified consisting of all county sheriffs of
Alabama and of all wardens and jailers of the city and town jails of Alabama. 236 F.
Supp. at 329. In Sims, a defendant class was certified of all the probate judges of Alabama
with three probate judges of the three counties as representatives. 377 U.S. at 537 n.2.
163. "The State's contentions that Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which relates to class actions, was violated in this case ... are without merit." Washington,
390 U.S. at 333. Ideally, more discussion of the nature of the challenge would exist. Yet
the challenge presumably was the same as that discussed in the reported decision below
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Not only did certification of defendant classes occur under old
Rule 23 that are analagous to subsection (b)(2) defendant classes,
but the Advisory Committee expressed as its main purpose in
revising the Rule in 1966, the elimination of the problems courts
experienced with the three categories of class actions under the old
Rule, known as true, hybrid, and spurious. The Committee also
sought to clarify that a judgment entered in a class action would
extend to all members of the class (such had not been the case
with the so-called spurious class), and to provide measures to
ensure procedural fairness. No other intended changes are dis-
cussed.'" If the Committee had intended to eliminate defendant
classes in subsection (b)(2) situations, one could reasonably have
expected the Committee to make a clear expression of that inten-
tion. The dilemma of the language alone should not be taken to
be such an expression.
Therefore, the ability to certify defendant classes in subsection
(b)(2) situations existed on the eve of the adoption of subsection
(b)(2). Thus, under the principles of statutory interpretation dis-
cussed above, the redrafting of Rule 23 in 1966 should not be
interpreted as overruling by implication, or by the inadvertence of
the Advisory Committee, that which previously existed.1 6 As pre-
viously discussed, 6 although the Advisory Committee Notes make
no mention of defendant classes, they make no mention of an
intention to abolish defendant class litigation in actions seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief. Thus, a statutory interpretation
analysis, when properly conducted, demonstrates that defendant
classes may be certified under Rule 23(b)(2).
involving whether a defendant class could be maintained under the then existing Rule 23.
Washington, 263 F. Supp. at 329. In Sims, the Court did not specifically address the
propriety of the certification of the defendant class, but clearly noted that it was affirming
an action brought against a class of defendants analogous to a (b)(2) defendant class. 377
U.S. at 539 n.2.
Several cases involving bilateral defendant classes have reached the Court after the
adoption of Rule 23, though the issue has not been specifically discussed. See, e.g., Zablocki
v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 379-80 (1978). The Court discusses that three issues relevant to
(b)(2) defendant class certification are not under appeal but does not include within that
list the propriety of (b)(2) class certification. Id. at 380 n.6. Perhaps one could infer that
the Court did not consider the question to be a relevant issue.
164. Proposed Rules, supra note 3, at 98-99.
165. One could argue that the defendant classes in Washington and Sims were of the
spurious category, and, therefore, absent members of the class were not bound by the
judgment, thus distinguishing the defendant class certification in those cases from (b)(2)
defendant class certification. Nevertheless, the res judicata effect of the decisions was not
so limited, and the actuality of the nature of the defendant classes is directly analogous to
a (b)(2) defendant class.




The courts that have considered the subsection (b)(2) language
dilemma have erred in their analysis by concluding, either for or
against certification, that the plain meaning of the language can
be discerned. This has led courts either to engage in unusual
contortions of analysis and language, or to refuse to engage in the
statutory interpretation analysis required to resolve the dilemma.
The required analysis, once performed, results in subsection (b)(2)
providing for certification of defendant classes. Additionally, the
language dilemma has caused the legacy of Paxman and Thomp-
son, which results in courts inserting into subsection (b)(2) a
requirement that is redundant of the requirements of Rule 23(a)
and that may unnecessarily restrict the scope of defendant class
certification under subsection (b)(2). Proper inquiry now should
turn to the application of the Rule 23(a) prerequisites, most notably
commonality and typicality, to defendant classes in order to prevent
the unmanageable, unfair defendant classes that the literalists have
feared.
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